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Title III of the Bioterrorism Act: Sacrificing U.S. Trade Relations in the
Name of Food Security
Abstract

Part I examines in detail the two conflicting laws that are the basis of this Comment—Title III of the
Bioterrorism Act and the SPS Agreement—focusing on those portions of Title III that adversely impact
international trade. Part I also presents the WTO case EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), the first food regulation case disputed in the WTO system for a violation of the SPS Agreement.
This case clarified the two major principles of the SPS Agreement that are explored in this Comment: the
prohibition on discrimination and the obligation to support trade–restrictive measures with an analytical risk
assessment. As such, it will be used as a tool to explain these principles and illustrate how a WTO member
could successfully dispute Title III’s compliance with the SPS Agreement.
Part II of this Comment analyzes Title III’s conformity with the SPS Agreement. This Part establishes that
Title III is subject to the SPS Agreement because it is a sanitary measure designed to protect human life and
health from the threat of deliberate food contamination. Part II then argues that, while motivated by the real
threat of bioterrorism, Title III nonetheless violates the nondiscrimination principle of Article 2.3 of the SPS
Agreement by discriminating against foreign imports. Part II also argues that Title III violates Article 5 of the
SPS Agreement because it is a trade restrictive regulation that is not based on a supportive risk assessment.
Finally, Part II asserts that, because Title III exempts a large number of direct-to-consumer food sources from
its administration, its overall ability to provide bioterrorism protection is significantly diminished. This
presents the question: if Title III fails to achieve its stated purpose, can it ever comply with the risk assessment
principle of the Agreement?
Part III concludes that Title III of the Bioterrorism Act violates two key provisions of the SPS Agreement.
Because the Bioterrorism Act as written specifically requires the trade-restrictive measures in question, Title
III should be rejected in its entirety to remain consistent with U.S. trade obligations under the WTO. This Part
then evaluates the implications of Title III’s breach of the SPS Agreement. If the United States retains the
measure, it risks an adverse decision from the dispute settlement system of the WTO. In closing, Part III
recommends that the United States collaborate with international trading partners in the future to achieve a
global bioterrorism solution that is sensitive to trade considerations.
Keywords
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Nondiscrimination principle
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INTRODUCTION
Emmentaler Exports is a food facility located in Bern, Switzerland
that processes and packages a variety of Swiss cheeses for export to
the United States. Gourmet Gouda, a domestic food facility located
in Peoria, Illinois, similarly produces gourmet cheeses for the U.S.
1
market and competes head-to-head with Emmentaler Exports. In
2002, however, Gourmet Gouda gained a considerable competitive
advantage over its rival, Emmentaler Exports, when the United States
passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
2
Response Act of 2002 (“Bioterrorism Act”). Designed to prevent and
1. Emmentaler Exports and Gourmet Gouda are fictitious companies used to
illustrate the adverse trade effect of the recent U.S. legislation that is the subject of
this Comment.
2. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., 21 U.S.C.A., and 42 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)). The Act
amends parts of three existing legislative protections: the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000), the Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 210
(2000), and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Section 511 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act makes the movement and sale of biological agents a criminal offense. 42 U.S.C.
§ 262 (2000). The Bioterrorism Act was passed largely in response to the 2001
anthrax attacks, where letters laced with anthrax sent to news media offices and
Senators on Capitol Hill infected twenty-two people. See David P. Fidler, Bioterrorism,
Public Health, and International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 7, 7 (2002) (illustrating how the
“full-blown nightmare” of the anthrax attacks made bioterrorism in the United States
“a terrifying reality”); James G. Hodge, Bioterrorism Law and Policy: Critical Choices in
Public Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 254, 255 (2002) (describing how the anthrax
attacks fueled fears of future bioterrorism attacks among both government officials
and the public at large).
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3

respond to the threat of bioterrorism, Title III of the Bioterrorism
4
Act—Protecting Safety and Security of Food and Drug Supply —
requires Emmentaler Exports, along with all foreign food facilities, to
5
designate a U.S. agent and to provide prior notice of every shipment
6
imported into the United States, at an annual cost of $425 million
7
per facility. Meanwhile, Gourmet Gouda and other domestic food
8
facilities continue to access the U.S. market at no additional expense.
The example of these hypothetical companies demonstrates the
burdensome impact this legislation has on foreign imports.
9
With measures to streamline and enhance federal response,
10
tighten control over existing biological agents in the United States,

3. See pmbl., 116 Stat. at 594 (stating that the purpose of the Bioterrorism Act is
“[t]o improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and respond to
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies”). Bioterrorism is the use of
biological, infectious agents to cause death or suffering in humans or other
organisms, presumably for an ideological or political purpose. See Hodge, supra note
2, at 254 (defining bioterrorism as “the intentional use of an infectious agent . . . to
cause death or disease in humans or other organisms in order to negatively influence
the conduct of government or intimidate a population”); see also Lisa Lovett, Food For
Thought: Consistent Protocol Could Strengthen Food Supply Security Measures, 10 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 465, 475 (2004) (describing food bioterrorism as the act of
“tampering with any link in the food supply chain to intentionally harm consumers
for presumably political purposes”).
4. §§ 301-336, 116 Stat. at 662-81 (codified as amended at scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)). As the relevant trade agreement does not address
pharmaceutical or drug regulation, this Comment focuses solely on the food
provisions of Title III, found in Subtitle A. See also infra note 21 (limiting further this
Comment’s focus to those portions of the trade agreement relating to sanitary (food)
measures).
5. 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d (West 2006) (requiring domestic and foreign food
facilities producing food for consumption in the United States to register with the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and additionally requiring foreign food
facilities to include in their registration the name of a designated U.S. agent to serve
as a communications link in both routine and emergency situations between the
facility and FDA).
6. § 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 381 (West 2006) (compelling foreign food exporters
seeking access to the U.S. market to further provide advance notice of all food
shipments before their arrival at a U.S. port).
7. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,505, 57,507
(Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (estimating the total annual costs
of hiring and retaining a U.S. agent at $164,500,000); Prior Notice of Imported Food
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974, 59,062, tbl.47 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) (calculating the total annual cost to foreign facilities of
providing prior notice to the United States at $260,633,000). Thus, foreign facilities
required to comply with the new provisions of Title III of the Bioterrorism Act will
spend a total of $425,163,000 annually to gain access to the U.S. market.
8. See supra notes 5-6 (describing how the requirements and associated costs of
registration and prior notice apply only to foreign food facilities).
9. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300hh-11 (West 2006) (creating a new Assistant Secretary
for Public Health and Emergency Preparedness to act as central command).

BOISEN_OFFTOPRINTER

670

1/30/2007 12:45:09 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:3
11

and protect the nation’s food, drug, and water supply, the
Bioterrorism Act is declared to be the “first line of defense against
12
Despite a general recognition that greater
bioterrorism.”
13
bioterrorism protection is needed, members of the international
trade community have raised concerns about the trade-restrictive
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300hh-11 (West 2003); § 201-31, 116 Stat. at 637-62 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., and 42 U.S.C.A. (West
2006)).
11. See §§ 301-336, 116 Stat. at 662-81 (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)); §§ 401-403, 116 Stat. at 682-87 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)); see also Cindy Skrzycki, A Heaping
Helping of Food Security, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2003, at E01 (reporting on the FDA’s
intent for the Bioterrorism Act to enhance food security without unnecessarily
burdening the food industry or the Agency, but describing the Act as so sweepingly
broad that lobster catchers in Maine will probably have to register with the FDA).
12. Ryan R. Kemper, Responding to Bioterrorism: An Analysis of Title I and II of the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 385, 403 (2005). Kemper assesses the historical problems of bioterrorism, the
2001 anthrax attacks, and future bioterrorist threats, examines the roles of the
various federal agencies responsible for components of bioterrorism prevention or
response, and then proceeds to analyze the recent bioterrorism legislation.
13. See, e.g., Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and
Responses, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 59, 91 (2000) (identifying a need for greater tools,
resources, and inter-agency cooperation to manage the consequences of
bioterrorism); David Johnston, Report Calls U.S. Agencies Understaffed for Bioterror, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 1, at 9 (citing a new report that calls federal agencies
underprepared for a bioterrorism attack and predicts agencies would likely be
overwhelmed by an attack, particularly due to a lack of sufficient medical and
scientific personnel in agency ranks); Research!America, 2001 Public Opinion Poll
on Bioterrorism & Research, Nov. 6, 2001, http://www.researchamerica.org/poll
data/2001/bioterrorism2001.pdf (polling Americans directly after the anthrax
attacks and reporting that fifty-five percent of Americans were concerned with the
future threat of bioterrorism); Trust for America’s Health, Poll on America’s Top
Health Concerns and Emergency Preparedness from Trust for America’s Health,
Feb.
2005,
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/budget05/PollingMemo.pdf
(confirming with recent poll data that Americans continue to believe the United
States is unprepared for a terrorist attack on the food supply). Experts disagree over
the probability of a bioterrorist occurrence. Compare Prior Notice of Imported Food
Under the Public Health Security Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,064 (Oct. 10, 2003)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (indicating that historical evidence suggests an
“intentional strike on the food supply is a low-probability . . . event”), with John G.
Bartlett, MD, Update in Infectious Diseases, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 273, 277-78
(Aug. 17, 1999), available at http://www.annals.org/cgi/reprint/131/4/273.pdf
(estimating a real risk from bioterrorism, as at least ten and possibly as many as
seventeen nations possess agents of biological warfare) and Center for Disease
Control, Bioterrorism Overview, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/overview.asp
(last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (reporting that biological agents are an attractive option
for terrorists). However, most experts do agree that a successful attack would be
devastating to American life, health, and the economy. See RISK ASSESSMENT FOR
FOOD TERRORISM AND OTHER FOOD SAFETY CONCERNS pt. II.B.2, ¶ 2 (2003)
(hereinafter “FDA RISK ASSESSMENT”), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/rabtact.html
(identifying the consequences of a bioterror attack as illnesses and death, social and
political implications, and economic effects, especially as “one out of every eight
Americans is estimated to work in an occupation directly linked to food
production”); Minnesota Dept. of Health, Bioterrorism: Questions and Answers
(2001), http://www.health.state.mn.us/bioterrorism/bioterqa.pdf (cautioning that
bioterrorism is a “high consequence risk”).
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15

portions of the Act, mainly Title III. Title III discriminates between
domestic and foreign food manufacturers by imposing increased
16
transaction costs and procedural burdens solely on foreign facilities.
As a consequence, Title III constitutes a barrier to trade likely to drive
17
foreign food manufacturers out of the U.S. market.

14. The Bioterrorism Act in general has elicited concerns and criticism. See, e.g.,
Kemper, supra note 12, at 413-15 (analyzing Titles I and II of the Act and concluding
that, although the Act helped to strengthen bioterrorism response mechanisms,
further improvement is needed to consolidate the actions of the numerous federal
agencies and improve coordination); Lovett, supra note 3, at 476-87 (criticizing the
food provisions of the Act, including Title II (governing the regulation of milk and
dairy products subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture) and
Title III (governing general food products and imports regulation by FDA) as
inefficient and likely unenforceable). See generally Lori. L. Buchsbaum, The U.S.
Public Health Response to Bioterrorism: Need for a Stronger Legislative Approach, 7 J. MED. &
L. 1, 25-29 (2003) (reviewing major pieces of legislation that address public health
emergencies and critiquing the Bioterrorism Act).
15. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, Protectionist Pressures in U.S. Forcing Bush to Ignore WTO
Obligations, EC Says, 21 INT’L TRADE REP. 19, 19 (2004) (discussing the contents of the
annual European Commission report on U.S. tariff and non-tariff barriers and citing
a “growing concern in Europe” that new U.S. measures to counter bioterrorism have
“unnecessarily trade-distorting effects”); Preliminary Comments of the European
Commission on the Bioterrorism Act, Aug. 30, 2002, http://ec.europa.eu/food/
international/trade/us_bio_act_prel_com_en.pdf (voicing initial concerns of the
Commission, the body which represents the European Union, that the Bioterrorism
Act is a major administrative and economic burden that creates a serious barrier to
trade in a memo to the FDA). Among additional comments on the new legislation
received by the FDA from domestic and foreign trade representative groups, nearly
thirty embassies submitted their concerns that Title III negatively impacts trade
relations. See FDA Dockets Management, http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/
default.htm (providing a searchable database of the comments received by the FDA,
and filed and published by Dockets Management). Criticism of Title III’s adverse
trade effect is not limited merely to foreign entities. See Rossella Brevetti, Association
Representing Millers Warns FDA Bioterrorism Proposal Would Hurt Trade, 20 INT’L TRADE
REP. 666, 666-67 (2003) (reporting that the North American Millers Association
(“NAMA”), which represents the milling industry on the entire North American
continent, has published concerns that the FDA’s proposed implementation of prior
notice is executed “in the most restrictive and commerce-restricting manner
possible”); Christopher S. Rugaber, Food Importers to Seek Flexibility in Proposed FDA
Prior Notice Regulation, 20 INT’L TRADE REP. 254, 254 (2003) (mentioning concerns of
the Grocery Manufacturers of America, a trade association, about the prior notice
regulation); Benjamin Onyango & Calum G. Turvey, Impact of the 2002 Bioterrorism Act
on the New Jersey Food Industry (Food Policy Inst., Rutgers Univ., Working Paper No.
WP-0603-010, 2003), available at http://www.foodpolicyinstitute.org/docs/bio
terrorism/impactofbioterrorismactNJfoodindustry.pdf (voicing domestic industry
fears that, as a result of the Bioterrorism Act’s general restrictions, fewer foreign
imports are likely and domestic business will suffer).
16. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 350d, 381 (West 2006) (imposing two new regulations
only upon foreign entities, which discriminates against foreign food suppliers and
favors the domestic food industry); see also infra notes 120-125 (describing the
disparate costs imposed on foreign facilities as a result of Title III regulation).
17. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,897
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (lodging the
complaint that “the proposed regulation is burdensome, costly, discriminatory, and
will have a negative impact on foreign trade”).
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This Comment takes up the cries of the international trade
community, analyzing Title III under the World Trade Organization
18
(“WTO”) Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS
19
Agreement”). The SPS Agreement recognizes the right of WTO
20
member countries to enact measures to protect against food-borne
21
risks, such as biological contamination, but seeks to ensure that such
22
measures do not unduly restrict trade. Title III violates this trade
agreement because it discriminates against foreign food suppliers,
thus restricting international trade, and is maintained without
23
support from a risk assessment, as is required.
Part I examines in detail the two conflicting laws that are the basis
of this Comment—Title III of the Bioterrorism Act and the SPS
18. The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was formed in 1995 as the successor
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and is an international organization
that operates as a multilateral trading system for countries worldwide. The main goal
of the WTO is to facilitate free trade on a global level, which it accomplishes, in part,
by administering and negotiating trade agreements. See generally BHAGIRATH LAL DAS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WTO AGREEMENT (1998) (presenting additional
information on the WTO and discussing the major WTO Agreements, basic trade
rules, and various administrative components of the system).
19. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, April
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994)
[hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal
_e/15-sps.pdf.
20. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization
(2005), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (listing
all 149 WTO members as of Dec. 2005). By its membership in the WTO, the United
States has pledged to abide by all WTO trade agreements, including the SPS
Agreement.
21. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.1 (declaring the right of members to
take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human,
animal, or plant life). Because Title III of the Bioterrorism Act does not regulate
plant or animal life or associated imports, this Comment focuses on the aspects of
the SPS Agreement governing measures intended to protect human life or health.
22. See id. art. 2.3 (admonishing that sanitary measures enacted by member
countries shall not be applied as disguised restrictions on trade in the form of
discrimination between domestic and foreign industry); see also Nick Covelli & Viktor
Hohots, The Health Regulation of Biotech Foods Under the WTO Agreements, 6 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 773, 777-78 (2003) (echoing that the Agreement’s purpose is to govern
sanitary measures and to limit the possibility that such measures are used as an
excuse to restrict trade). See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving International
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the WTO: Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 81 (2000) (reviewing the major provisions of the SPS Agreement and three
of the four cases disputed in the WTO system under the Agreement, and suggesting
possible future reforms to clarify and expand the application of the SPS Agreement).
The fourth case disputed under the SPS Agreement was decided after the previous
article’s publication. See generally Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting the
Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Japan-Apples].
23. SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.1 (requiring all members to produce or
obtain supportive risk assessments upon which sanitary measures should be based);
see infra Part II.B (concluding that Title III violates two key principles of the SPS
Agreement—the prohibition on discrimination and the requirement that members
obtain risk assessments in support of enacted sanitary measures).
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Agreement—focusing on those portions of Title III that adversely
24
impact international trade. Part I also presents the WTO case EC
25
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), the first food
regulation case disputed in the WTO system for a violation of the SPS
26
Agreement. This case clarified the two major principles of the SPS
Agreement that are explored in this Comment: the prohibition on
discrimination and the obligation to support trade–restrictive
27
measures with an analytical risk assessment. As such, it will be used
as a tool to explain these principles and illustrate how a WTO
member could successfully dispute Title III’s compliance with the SPS
Agreement.
Part II of this Comment analyzes Title III’s conformity with the SPS
Agreement. This Part establishes that Title III is subject to the SPS
Agreement because it is a sanitary measure designed to protect
human life and health from the threat of deliberate food
contamination. Part II then argues that, while motivated by the real
28
threat of bioterrorism, Title III nonetheless violates the nondiscrimination principle of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement by
discriminating against foreign imports. Part II also argues that Title
24. See infra Part I.A (describing in detail the requirements imposed by the
registration and prior notice provisions of Title III on food facilities); see also Peter
Menyasz, Newfoundland Raises Trade Concerns About Proposed U.S. Bioterrorism
Regulations, 20 INT’L TRADE REP. 647, 647 (2003) (describing the Newfoundland
government’s efforts to appeal to the U.S. government about the new bioterrorism
legislation, particularly the prior notice provisions and their resulting impact on
Newfoundland’s substantial seafood exports to the United States); Daniel Pruzin,
U.S. Trading Partners Concerning with Rules for Food Registration Under Bioterrorism Act, 20
INT’L TRADE REP. 1158, 1158 (2003) (expressing concerns from WTO members such
as the European Union, China, and Mexico, among others, that the registration
requirements are more trade-restrictive than necessary).
25. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter ECHormones].
26. Id. ¶¶ 253-255 (setting out the findings and conclusions of the Appellate
Body and concluding that Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement was violated). See
generally Dale E. McNiel, The First Case Under the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement: The European Union’s Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 89, 93 (1999)
(conducting a thorough analysis of the initial dispute between the European Union
and the United States under the SPS Agreement).
27. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 210-246 (assessing the argument that the
European Community (“EC”) violated Articles 5.5 and 2.3 of the SPS Agreement,
which prohibit discrimination); id. ¶¶ 178-209 (addressing the claim that the EC also
violated Article 5.1 by maintaining a sanitary measure without adequate support from
a risk assessment).
28. See Challenges Before Indian Food Exporters, THE HINDU, Nov. 3, 2003, http://
www.hindu.com/biz/2003/11/03/stories/2003110300040200.htm (opining, in an
article of the online edition of India’s national newspaper, that the Bioterrorism Act
was “clearly intended to prevent the possibility of” a bioterror attack “using the food
chain,” and disputing the argument that the Bioterrorism Act was motivated by
protectionist pressures).
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III violates Article 5 of the SPS Agreement because it is a trade
restrictive regulation that is not based on a supportive risk
assessment. Finally, Part II asserts that, because Title III exempts a
large number of direct-to-consumer food sources from its
administration, its overall ability to provide bioterrorism protection is
29
significantly diminished. This presents the question: if Title III fails
to achieve its stated purpose, can it ever comply with the risk
assessment principle of the Agreement?
Part III concludes that Title III of the Bioterrorism Act violates two
key provisions of the SPS Agreement. Because the Bioterrorism Act
as written specifically requires the trade-restrictive measures in
question, Title III should be rejected in its entirety to remain
30
consistent with U.S. trade obligations under the WTO. This Part
then evaluates the implications of Title III’s breach of the SPS
Agreement. If the United States retains the measure, it risks an
31
adverse decision from the dispute settlement system of the WTO. In
closing, Part III recommends that the United States collaborate with
international trading partners in the future to achieve a global
32
bioterrorism solution that is sensitive to trade considerations.
I. THE ELEMENTS OF A TRADE DISPUTE: TITLE III OF THE
BIOTERRORISM ACT AND THE BASIC OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WTO
AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY
MEASURES
The most basic principle of international trade is that goods and
services from exporting countries should enjoy virtually free access

29. See infra Part II.B.2.c (highlighting that registration exempts both restaurants
and retail establishments from its requirements and arguing that these exemptions
create gaping holes in Title III’s bioterrorism protection, through which bioterrorists
can easily slip).
30. See infra notes 244-245 (describing how the letter of the Bioterrorism Act
imposes measures that act as barriers to trade and constrains the FDA’s ability to
lessen its trade-restrictive effects); see also Peter A. Quinter, Scrap the Bioterrorism Act,
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE 44, Feb. 15, 2004, available at http://www.becker-poliakoff.
com/attorneys/bios/quinter_p.html (click on “Scrap the Bioterrorism Act”
hyperlink under “Articles”) (highlighting numerous problems with the Bioterrorism
Act, including the fact that over seventy-five percent of companies failed to register
by the required deadline of December 12, 2003, and describing the Act as “an affront
to foreign countries” that “will not significantly increase the security of the U.S. food
supply”).
31. See infra note 90 and accompanying text (describing the quasi-judicial dispute
settlement mechanism employed by the WTO to resolve trade disputes between
WTO members).
32. See infra notes 253-254 (suggesting ways in which the United States can join
efforts to form international, cooperative bioterrorism prevention proposals already
underway).
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33

into an importing country.
Tariffs, however, are an age-old
mechanism used to protect domestic production from foreign
34
Non-tariff barriers also
competition by taxing imported goods.
exist, which have the same effect of a tariff, but are not in the easily
35
recognizable form of a tax.
Food regulation has become an
increasingly visible issue in trade disputes, as health and safety rules
36
often disguise an underlying intent to favor domestic industry.
Title III of the Bioterrorism Act acts as a non-tariff barrier and
restricts food imports by imposing increased transaction costs and
procedural burdens on foreign food exporters trading with the
37
United States. As such, it directly conflicts with the objective of the
WTO Agreements, and the SPS Agreement in particular, to reduce
tariffs and non-tariff regulatory actions that impede free trade.
A. Title III: Protecting the Safety and Security of the U.S. Food Supply
In an effort to protect the food supply and prepare the nation for
the possibility of a bioterrorist attack, Title III regulations augment
38
the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) authority over food

33. LAL DAS, supra note 18, at 1.
34. Id. at 19-27 (classifying and defining various types of tariffs).
35. See TIM JOSLING ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, FOOD
REGULATION AND TRADE: TOWARD A SAFE AND OPEN GLOBAL SYSTEM 1, 16-21, tbl.2.1
(2004) (categorizing various types of food regulations that may act as non-tariff
barriers to trade); see also David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of
the World Trade Organization: An Assessment after Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
865, 865 (2000) (illustrating that, although one success of the WTO trading system
has been a sharp reduction in tariffs, many “governments have kept protectionism in
place by simply shifting from tariff to non-tariff measures” to offer domestic industry
protection from foreign competition).
36. See generally JOSLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 16 (describing a number of
different factors that contribute to the growing dispute over food regulation).
Because both the observable risk of a given measure and availability of information
about potential risks may differ among nations, the benefits of a given regulation
may exceed its costs in one nation, but not another. See id. at 29 (displaying a
graphical analysis of “regulatory underprotection and overprotection”). Also, the
general provision of farm support and protection policies, especially in wealthier
nations, infuses politics into the already complicated system of regulation and can
discourage developing nations from trade on a larger scale. See id. at 3-7 (conveying
the international impact from the recent “globalization of the food system”).
37. See infra notes 117-124 and accompanying text (demonstrating the title’s
negative effect on foreign trade as a result of its restrictions on food imports); see also
Sean D. Murphy, Bioterrorism Act’s Notice Requirements for Food Imports, 98 AM. J. INT’L L.
837, 838 (2004) (calling the Bioterrorism Act’s prior notice provision a non-tariff
barrier to trade).
38. As the FDA is the federal agency in charge of the majority of food regulation
in the United States, its leadership in this area was a natural choice. Meat and dairy
products, regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture, are not
included under the auspices of Title III, but are touched upon elsewhere. See Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 7 U.S.C.A.
§ 8401 (West 2006); see also FDA Registration of Food Facilities, 21 C.F.R. § 1.226(g)
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imports and enforce specific conditions on food manufacturers.
The FDA is charged with implementing Title III and has proceeded
40
to do so through its normal process of rulemaking. Of Title III’s
various provisions, section 305, Registration of Food Facilities
41
(“Registration”), and section 307, Prior Notice of Imported Foods
42
(“Prior Notice”), are of great concern to the international trade
community because they each impose burdens solely on foreign
facilities.

(2006) (exempting facilities regulated by the Department of Agriculture from
registration requirements).
39. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 334, 381 (West 2006) (expanding the FDA’s
administrative authority over food imports to prevent the spread of contaminated
food articles); 21 U.S.C.A. § 350c (West 2006) (requiring domestic food facilities to
maintain records of sales transactions and providing the FDA with the authority to
inspect such records as needed).
40. See FDA Bioterrorism Act Homepage, http://www.fda.gov/oc/bioterrorism/
bioact.html (providing a link to all FDA actions on the Bioterrorism Act generally,
Title III specifically, and a summary document titled “FDA Actions on Bioterrorism
Legislation”). See generally KENNETH R. PIÑA & WAYNE L. PINES, FOOD AND DRUG LAW
INSTITUTE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION
(1998)(giving an overview of food and drug law and explaining the FDA regulatory
process governing food and drug products). Under the authority provided in Title
III, the FDA has issued both an interim rule and a final rule with respect to
registration. See Registration of Food Facilities, 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.225-1.243 (codifying
the FDA regulations); Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 70 Fed. Reg.
57,505 (Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (announcing the
affirmation of the interim rule [Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 58,894 (Oct. 10, 2003) (interim rule)] and noting that the final rule does not
make any changes to those regulatory requirements established in the interim final
rule). For prior notice, the FDA has issued only an interim final rule; however, given
the lack of substantive change between the interim and final version of the
registration regulation, this likely constitutes the FDA’s final determination of how to
implement the prior notice requirements. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
68 Fed. Reg. 58,974 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule);
see also Joint FDA-CBP Plan for Increasing Integration and Assessing the
Coordination of Prior Notice Timeframes, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~pn/pnplan2
.html (specifying three ways in which the FDA and CBP are partnering on prior
notice requirements, and announcing the FDA’s intention to publish a final rule on
prior notice by June 2005, which has not yet been realized). The majority of
references herein will be to the interim rules, with the understanding that for prior
notice the interim rule is, in fact, the binding regulation.
41. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d (West 2006) (amending Chapter IV of the Federal
Food Drug & Cosmetic Act by adding a new section, section 415, to the end of the
existing text); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.225-1.243 (implementing section 305 of Title
III).
42. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 381 (West 2006) (amending section 801 of the
Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act by adding a new section, section 801(m)(1), at
the end of the existing text); see also FDA Prior Notice of Imported Food, 21 C.F.R.
§§ 1.276-1.282 (2006) (implementing section 307 of Title III).
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Section 305, Registration, requires domestic and foreign facilities
43
that supply food for consumption in the United States to register
the name and address of the facility, all applicable trade names under
which the facility or parent company operates, and the general food
44
category of the product with the FDA. Registration is designed to
deter bioterrorism by providing a disincentive against intentional
45
contamination, and to respond to potential threats by facilitating
46
Accordingly, non-compliance with
rapid agency response.
registration is a prohibited act and any imports from foreign facilities
43. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d(a)(1) (West 2006) (defining the types of facilities that
must register under the Bioterrorism Act as any facility “engaged in manufacturing,
processing, packing, or holding food for consumption in the United States”). But see
id. § 350d(b)(1) (exempting farms, restaurants, other retail food establishments,
nonprofit food establishments in which food is prepared for or served directly to the
consumer, and fishing vessels from Title III requirements); see also id.
§ 350d(b)(3)(B) (providing that if a foreign facility exports to another facility for
further processing or packaging, the former facility is not required to register, but
the latter is unless the subsequent processing is of a de minimis nature, such as
labeling); id. § 350d(b)(3)(A) (requiring storage facilities to register, but exempting
companies that merely trans-ship food products through the United States, intended
for a final destination outside U.S. borders).
44. See id. § 350d(a)(1) (listing the various registration requirements); id.
§ 350d(a)(2) (pronouncing that the general food category should be included in
registration, if determined to be necessary by the FDA through guidance); see also
Guidance for Industry on Necessity of the Use of Food Product Categories in
Registration of Food Facilities, 68 Fed. Reg. 42,415 (July 17, 2003) (concluding that
information about food product categories is necessary for an effective response to
food-related emergencies). Other contact information is also required under the
FDA rules implementing the registration section. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.232(a)-(b), (e)
(codifying the FDA regulations that add to the Title III requirements); Registration
of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,378 (proposed Feb. 3, 2003) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing to add to the Bioterrorism Act the
requirement that registration contain: the name of the parent company that owns
the facility, if applicable, the phone number of the facility, and an emergency
contact); cf. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,922
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (justifying, in the
response to comment 116, the FDA requirements that exceed those imposed by the
legislative act).
45. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,951-52
(summarizing the benefits of the new registration provision and explaining that the
added capability to trace incidents of contamination may deter individuals from
intentionally contaminating the food supply, for fear of subsequent discovery and
apprehension).
46. See id. (announcing additionally that the increased traceability under
registration will enable the FDA to quickly track the roots of any incident of
contamination and proceed accordingly to contain any outbreak). The Agency
further believes that maintaining emergency contact information for domestic and
foreign facilities will permit more timely communication with the FDA to occur and,
consequently, allow both the Agency and the facility to respond effectively to limit
the effects of a possible contamination. See also infra note 50 and accompanying text
(clarifying that the role of the U.S. agent, required for foreign facilities, is to serve as
a communications link with the FDA in both emergency and routine situations).
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that are not properly registered will be detained and barred entry
47
into the United States.
Foreign facilities that import FDA-regulated food products are
additionally required to designate a U.S. agent in their registration
48
with the FDA.
The FDA has issued only two requirements with
respect to the responsibility, liability, and overall role of the U.S.
agent: the agent must reside or maintain a place of business within
the United States and must be physically present in the United
49
States. The agent’s sole responsibility is to act as a communications
link between the FDA and the facility in order to convey information
50
in both routine and emergency situations.
In addition to the registration requirements, foreign facilities
exporting food products into the United States must comply with
section 307, Prior Notice, and submit advance notice of all imports in
47. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(dd) (West 2006) (making the failure to register in
accordance with Title III a prohibited act under the existing Federal Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act); 21 U.S.C.A. § 381(c) (subjecting the food product of a foreign facility
that fails to register to immediate detainment until proper registration is received by
the FDA); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1.241(a) (explaining that, because failure to comply
with registration is a prohibited act under 21 U.S.C. § 331, both civil and criminal
penalties may apply); id. § 1.241(b) (providing that if a facility fails to update its
registration—for example, to reflect a change in ownership—the FDA may
consequently cancel the registration); id. § 1.241(c) (giving the FDA authority to
seize and detain any food shipments from foreign food facilities that have not
properly registered).
48. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d(a)(1)(B); 21 C.F.R. § 1.232(d) (calling for the name,
address and phone number of the U.S. agent to be included in the registration of
any foreign food facility).
49. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.227(b)(13) (defining a “U.S. agent” and reiterating the two,
seemingly similar requirements, that the person designated as “agent” maintain a
physical address within the United States and be physically present at that address
within the United States); see also id. § 1.227(b)(13)(i)-(ii) (defining the
communication role of the agent and explaining that the FDA will, for all intents and
purposes, treat representations made by the agent as representations of the foreign
facility); Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,915
(describing, in the response to comment 84, the duties of the U.S. agent and
clarifying the limited liability protection afforded to agents unless the agent
knowingly submits false information to the FDA or the foreign facility and the agent
are essentially the same entity).
50. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,915.
(describing, in the response to comment 85, the agent’s communications role and
providing the opportunity for facilities to designate an alternative emergency
contact). Before publishing its final rule on registration, the FDA allowed comment
on just two issues—the cost to foreign facilities of hiring and retaining a U.S. agent
and the effect on domestic business if some foreign facilities cease export due to the
new agent requirement—illustrating the controversy surrounding this particular
provision. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,505, 57,506
(Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (explaining that although the
FDA received over 200 comments on the interim rule, it rejected those outside the
set scope).
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51

order to gain access to the U.S. market.
Prior notice must be
52
submitted electronically and must include, inter alia, a description
of the food article, the identity of the manufacturer, shipper, and
grower of the article, the country from which the article originates,
53
and the anticipated port of entry. Congress gave the FDA discretion
to determine the length of time necessary to receive, review, and
54
respond sufficiently to prior notification submissions. Accordingly,
the FDA established the following scheme for food articles: prior
notice must be received a minimum of two hours before arriving by
vehicle, four hours before arriving by train or air, and eight hours
55
before arriving by sea vessel.
After prior notice has been received and accepted, the FDA will not
56
allow modifications without restarting the clock. This means that if,
for example, a facility needs to update its prior notice submissions to
reflect a change in the anticipated port of entry due to weather
conditions, it must submit the modified prior notice anew, either two,
four, or eight hours before arrival, depending on the mode of
51. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 381 (West 2006); FDA Prior Notice of Imported Food, 21
C.F.R. § 1.277(a) (2006) (applying the regulation to all food, for humans or animals,
that is imported or offered for import, with the exception of those items exempted
in subsection (b)).
52. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 1.231(a)-(c) (permitting electronic registration,
registration by fax or mail, and CD-ROM submissions for multiple registrations), with
21 C.F.R. § 1.280 (requiring prior notice to be submitted electronically, in English,
through either the U.S. Custom and Border Protection (“CBP”) Automated Broker
Interface (“ABI/ACS”) or the newly created FDA PIN System Interface). Prior notice
submissions are allowed by email or fax, but only if one or both electronic systems
are temporarily malfunctioning. 21 C.F.R. § 1.280(c)-(d). Thus, some facilities will
be forced to update their technological capabilities specifically to comply with prior
notice.
53. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.281; Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg.
58,974, 58,978 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule)
(listing the information that must be included in a prior notice submission); see also
id. at 58,980 (comparing, in Table 1A, the information that must be submitted as
prior notice for each specific mode of transportation).
54. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 381 (West 2006) (capping the FDA’s response time at five
days, but otherwise affording the FDA great latitude).
55. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.279; Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at
59,044 (setting forth the required time frame for Prior Notice submissions under
option six, which was selected from twelve options considered in the FDA interim
final rule ); see id. at 59,045-46 (displaying estimated costs for option six, in Tables 2325, including loss in value resulting from prior notice that must be resubmitted;
learning, coordination, and technology costs; and the cost of actual employee time to
fill out and submit the prior notice information).
56. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.282(a)(2) (explaining the procedure for resubmissions of
prior notice, which must be completed each time information changes after the FDA
has confirmed receipt of prior notice, and reiterating the fact that resubmissions
must be received under the same time frames as an original prior notice
submission).
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transportation. The FDA believes that the time frames adopted in
57
the interim rule reduce the need for amended submissions and that
58
its strict stance on modifications is therefore warranted. Still, some
facilities will inevitably experience unexpected change mid-shipment
and the FDA’s modification policy may prevent these facilities from
meeting originally scheduled arrival times or subsequent deadlines.
The purpose of prior notice is to provide more precise information
about what food products are being imported into the United States
and to enable the FDA to respond to specific bioterrorism threats
59
and prevent the dissemination of contaminated foods. As a result,
any food offered for import without proper prior notice will be
57. The FDA initially proposed that notice be received by noon on the calendar
day before the food product arrived for import but, after multiple adverse comments
were received, the FDA settled on a shorter time frame (option six) in the interim
rule. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,428, 5,429
(proposed Feb. 3, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing the abovedescribed rule); see also Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health
Security Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,025 (listing the twelve regulatory options
considered by the FDA, assessing the costs associated with each option, and settling
finally on option six). Many of the concerned comments dealt with trade between
the United States and its neighbors. See, e.g., FASonline Summary, United States–
Canada Consultative Committee on Agriculture (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.
fas.usda.gov/itp/canada/CCA-11-19-04.asp (noting Canadian concerns that the prior
notice rule will result in prohibitive costs for businesses and suggesting an alternative
model for goods shipped via truck); Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc.
(“GMA”), Comment on Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002; Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Apr. 4, 2003, http://www.gmabrands.com/publicpolicy/docs/
comment_p.cfm?DocID=1109 (commenting on the problems with the FDA’s
proposed rule and providing a helpful illustration of how such a requirement would
seriously impact business with Canada and Mexico). The GMA’s comment questions
the efficiency of the enforcement of prior notice and provides the example of a
hypothetical Canadian facility, located one hour north of the U.S. border, required
to delay shipment after loading a truck in order to provide the required advance
notice (two hours) of the truck’s specific contents post-loading. Id.
58. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security Act of
2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,013 (“FDA has chosen timeframes that provide it with very
little leeway in the time it has to ‘receive, review and respond’ to the prior notice
submissions. Thus, we concluded that we could no longer permit changes to prior
notice without restarting the clock.”).
59. See id. at 59,064 (predicting that enhanced knowledge of what articles of food
are being imported into the United States will help the FDA identify which imports
require further inspection and which are safe for entry). The FDA illustrates, in the
interim rule, the benefit added by prior notice’s increased information by
analogizing to its past experience with the potentially devastating consequences of
unintentional food contamination. Id. at 59,064-65. For example, just one truckload
of diseased cantaloupes represents roughly 1,652 servings of fruit. Id. at 59,064. If
the FDA receives advance information about a similar truckload of intentionally
contaminated melons, such as a report that an employee at a facility that ships
melons from Mexico to the United States has ties to suspected terrorists, prior notice
will permit the FDA to act with Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) to detain the
appropriate imports and investigate further, thus preventing the infected
cantaloupes from reaching unsuspecting American mouths. Id. at 59,065.
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60

refused admission into the United States. Additionally, if notice is
deficient or inaccurate, the FDA may detain the food at port until
61
Finally, because the FDA
notice is corrected to its satisfaction.
expects registration and prior notice to work together to provide
62
greater protection of the domestic food supply, failure to register
under section 305 is treated as a failure to provide adequate notice
63
under section 307.
B. The SPS Agreement: Reducing Barriers to the Free Trade of Food
WTO member countries negotiated the SPS Agreement to reduce
traditional food disputes, as well as regulations that more subtly
64
inhibit trade, and to harmonize food regulation and trade
65
conditions using international standards. As such, the Agreement
66
applies broadly to any regulation that is a sanitary or phytosanitary
67
measure and has an adverse effect on international trade. The SPS
60. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, 21 U.S.C.A. § 381 (West 2006); 21 C.F.R. § 1.283(a)(1)(i) (stating that food
imports that reach a U.S. port without a proper prior notice submission will be
detained and subject to refusal of admission).
61. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.283(a)(1)(ii)-(iii) (specifying that imported shipments are
also subject to refusal of admission when prior notice submissions are inaccurate or
not received within the appropriate time frame); Prior Notice of Imported Food
Under the Public Health Security Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,016 (describing
that, to the extent possible, exporters submitting prior notice will be notified if the
FDA identifies in advance a problem with the submission and the exporters will be
allowed to correct the deficiency). If the FDA identifies and provides notice of a
problem, but that problem is not corrected, the food article will be subject to normal
sanctions, including refusal. Id.
62. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security Act of
2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,985 (declaring that “[r]egistration is designed to work in
concert with prior notice”).
63. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.285 (describing the interrelation between the regulations in
Subpart I, governing prior notice submissions, and Subpart H, regulating mandatory
registration); see also Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health
Security Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,022 (emphasizing the importance of
registration so that the “FDA knows who is responsible for the information in the
prior notice and can communicate with them when necessary”).
64. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, at pmbl. (announcing that WTO members
have entered into the SPS Agreement desiring to improve the human health
situation in all member countries and to establish a “multilateral framework of rules
and disciplines to guide the development, adoption and enforcement of sanitary and
phytosanitary measures in order to minimize their negative effects on trade”); see also
JOSLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 40 (asserting that the SPS Agreement was negotiated
to reduce trade conflicts, lower transactions costs, and “make it more difficult for
countries to shelter domestic industries” behind restrictive regulations).
65. See Victor, supra note 35, at 875 (stating that the SPS Agreement’s primary
purpose is to promote trade by restricting the use of sanitary measures as trade
barriers).
66. The SPS Agreement also applies to phytosanitary measures, which this
Comment will not discuss. See supra note 21.
67. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.1 (affirming that the Agreement
applies to all sanitary measures negatively affecting international trade, either
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68

Agreement contains five basic principles that countries must adhere
69
to when enacting domestic sanitary measures: scientific justification,
70
71
72
equivalence,
harmonization,
and risk
non-discrimination,
73
assessment.
One of the most basic obligations under the SPS Agreement is that
members must ensure that all sanitary measures are applied only to
74
75
the extent necessary to protect human life and health and are

directly or indirectly). The Agreement applies to all measures enacted after January
1, 1995 and those pre-existing measures that continue to be in force.
68. See Lisa K. Seilheimer, Note, The SPS Agreement Applied: The WTO Hormone Beef
Case, 4 ENVTL. L. 537, 548 (1998) (alternatively depicting three broad categories of
the Agreement: “Article 2 denotes the basic rights and obligations of Members
under the Agreement. Article 3 deals with the goal of establishing consistency of
sanitary measures . . . . Article 5 imposes the obligation of risk assessment and
discusses how Members should determine and apply appropriate sanitary
measures”).
69. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.2 (stating that sanitary measures
must be based on scientific principles).
70. See id. art. 2.3; see also id. art. 5.5 (reflecting Article 2.3 non-discrimination
principles by instructing members to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in
the levels of protection deemed appropriate in different situations).
71. See id. art. 4 (asserting that member countries must accept the sanitary
measures of other members as equivalent).
72. See id. art. 3; see also id. Annex A.2 (defining harmonization as “the
establishment, recognition and application of common sanitary and phytosanitary
measures by different Members”).
73. See id. art. 5 (explaining the various risk assessment requirements and
emphasizing the need for members to ensure that sanitary measures take into
account relevant health risks). It is important to note the somewhat overlapping
application of these SPS Agreement principles. For example, the scientific evidence
that is required as a basis for measures under Article 2.2 can be used to support a
deviation from harmonization with an international standard under the procedure
outlined in Article 3.3, and must be taken into account in the assessment of risks
under Article 5.2. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 187 (enumerating the factors to
be considered in a risk assessment and focusing on both the consideration of
scientific evidence in the form of controlled experiments and the real world risk to
human societies); see also infra note 85 (discussing the interplay between the risk
assessment Articles 5.1 and 5.5, and the non-discrimination Articles 2.2 and 2.3
respectively). Additionally, while discrimination is prohibited explicitly in Article 2.3,
it is also incorporated in one of the specific risk assessment principles: Article 5.5.
See supra note 70 (noting also the relationship between the two non-discrimination
articles); infra note 228 (describing how there is an additional connection between
Article 5.1 and the harmonization principle of Article 3.3, so that a violation of
Article 5.1 can trigger, in and of itself, a violation of Article 3.3).
74. A Dispute Panel under the GATT, the international trade agreement that was
the precursor to the WTO Agreement, provides some basis for interpreting this term.
See Covelli & Hohots, supra note 22, at 778 (citing Report of the Panel, Thailand—
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7. 1990, GATT
B.I.S.D. (37 Supp.) (1990)). Covelli & Hohots note that under this Panel’s decision
a sanitary measure that is not the least trade-restrictive measure available to protect
human health will likely violate trade law.
75. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, arts. 2.3, 5.6 (admonishing members to
ensure that measures enacted are not more trade restrictive than necessary to
achieve the desired level of protection and urging members to avoid applying
measures in a manner that would constitute a disguised barrier to trade).
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76

based on scientific principles and evidence. Members pledge also
not to discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably where similar
conditions prevail; in other words, members cannot impose different
conditions on different countries or set different conditions between
77
domestic and foreign industry.
Equivalence provides another
78
If an
opportunity to reduce discrimination between nations.
exporting member objectively demonstrates that its own domestic
measure provides an equivalent level of sanitary protection to that
deemed appropriate by the importing member, the importing
79
member must recognize and accept the equivalent measure.
76. See id. arts. 2.1, 2.2 (acknowledging that members have the right to enact
appropriate sanitary measures in Article 2.1, but nonetheless requiring, under Article
2.2, that members support those measures with scientific evidence); see also Kennedy,
supra note 22, at 84 (explaining that members are free to set their own levels of
protection, including a “zero risk” level, so long as the level of protection is
defensible with scientific justification and Article 5 risk assessment); cf. Victor, supra
note 35, at 872 (arguing that the scientific justification and risk assessment principles
are the two most critical elements of the SPS Agreement). But see SPS Agreement,
supra note 19, art. 5.7 (permitting members to provisionally adopt sanitary measures
on the basis of pertinent available information, as an exception to the scientific
justification rule, when relevant scientific evidence is insufficient). This principle,
the so-called “precautionary principle,” has been the subject of considerable debate
in the international community among academics, legal practitioners, and judges
alike. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 123 & n.92 (discussing the principle, in the
context of the EC’s argument that the principle should apply to its ban on
hormones, and providing a sample of the differing views on the principle’s
application as a rule of international law). Significantly, for the purposes of this
Comment, the Appellate Body found that, while the precautionary principle is
specifically written into Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, an adjudicating body must
apply normal principles of interpretation to examine the SPS Agreement as a whole.
Id. ¶ 124. Therefore, the precautionary principle does not, by itself, override the
remaining provisions of the Agreement that are otherwise inconsistent with the
principle, such as Article 5, which requires members to complete a risk assessment
with relevant scientific evidence. Id. Thus, the United States cannot validly assert the
precautionary principle in support of Title III or use it to rebut the argument that
the title violates Article 5.
77. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.3 (compelling members to ensure
that the application of sanitary measures is not applied in such a manner as to
constitute a disguised restriction on trade); see also id. art. 5.5 (requiring, under the
risk assessment principles, that different levels of protection be supported by a risk
assessment, and that there be no arbitrary distinctions); Victor, supra note 35, at 882
(noting the “curious tension” between the non-discrimination articles and the rest of
the Agreement, which repeatedly underscores member countries’ ability to set their
own levels of appropriate protection).
78. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 4.
79. See id. art. 4.1 (directing members to accept exporting countries’ measures
when they are shown to provide an equivalent level of protection as the importing
countries’ measures); id. art. 4.2 (expecting members to consult and negotiate
among themselves an equivalent procedure or measure); see also Guidelines for the
Development of Equivalence Agreements Regarding Food Import and Export
Inspection and Certification Systems, CAC/GL 34-1999, available at http://www.
codexalimentarius.net/web/standard_list.do (listing all available Codex guidelines);
Guidelines on the Judgment of Equivalence of Sanitary Measures Associated with
Food Inspection and Certification Systems, CAC/GL 53-2003, available at http://
www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/10047/CXG_053e.pdf (outlining
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To harmonize conditions between member countries and achieve
international consensus with respect to food standards, members are
80
required to base newly-enacted sanitary measures on existing
81
international standards. For food regulation, the SPS Agreement
endorses the guidelines promulgated by the Codex Alimentarius
82
Commission. However, members may enact more stringent sanitary
83
measures than the relevant international standard if the higher level
of protection is justified by scientific evidence or based on a risk
84
analysis. Independent from this requirement, all sanitary measures
85
must be based on a risk assessment.
The risk assessment must
the process to develop and achieve equivalence agreements for inspection and
certification systems, to provide guidance to WTO members).
80. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.2 (asserting that a sanitary measure
that conforms to international standards is permissible per se); see also Kennedy,
supra note 22, at 85 (noting that the SPS Agreement, in Article 3.2, has built in an
incentive that encourages members to comply with relevant international standards
by establishing a “rebuttable presumption” that a measure conforming to an
international standard is valid).
81. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.1 (recognizing that although in some
areas of food regulation no international standards exist (an unresolved loophole in
the application of the trade agreement) members must, nonetheless, look to
international standards for guidance whenever possible).
82. See id. Annex A3 (reiterating that the Codex Alimentarius Commission’s
standards apply to issues of food safety); see also Codex Alimentarius Commission
Website, http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp (last visited Nov. 11,
2006) (providing Codex standards in a searchable database and in list form).
83. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.3. Paradoxically, the SPS Agreement
permits member countries to enact sanitary measures that provide lower levels of
protection than the relevant international standards. See Bruce A. Silverglade, The
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Weakening Food Safety
Regulations to Facilitate Trade?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 517, 520-22 (2000) (arguing that
the SPS Agreement, as a trade instrument, fails to provide safe and sanitary foods
because of its focus on minimizing trade effects). Silverglade asserts that because
nothing in the Agreement allows a member country to challenge another member’s
food safety standards as too low, downward harmonization of global food safety
standards is inherently built into the trade agreement. Silverglade thus advocates for
“an international food safety agreement, not just an international trade agreement
on food safety” to upwardly harmonize global food conditions. Id. at 517. But see
Kennedy, supra note 22, at 86 (asserting that the SPS Agreement does not require
“downward harmonization” through the adoption of less stringent measures).
84. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.3 (stating that members may
introduce higher levels of sanitary protection if there is scientific justification, or if
the member determines under Article 5 Assessment of Risk and Determination of
the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection that the higher level is
justified); see also Victor, supra note 35, at 876 (perceiving that there are two
alternatives with respect to international standards: implement the standard, or
deviate from it with adequate support).
85. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, arts. 5.1-5.5 (directing members to
consider international risk assessment guidelines, available scientific evidence,
relevant economic factors, the objective of minimizing negative trade effects, and the
principle of non-discrimination in the assessment of risks). Note that the purpose of
the risk assessment differs depending on whether the measure in question is
intended to protect human or animal life or health, or plant life or health. See id.
Annex A.4 (stating that a risk assessment to protect human or animal life and health
must establish that there is a risk arising from the presence of additives, toxins, or
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demonstrate that the measure is necessary to achieve the level of
86
sanitary protection that the WTO member has deemed appropriate.
Furthermore, other WTO members may request justification for
87
deviations from an international standard.
Because all members pledge to abide by the SPS Agreement’s
restrictive provisions, members have the right to take action against
88
other countries whose sanitary measures are not in compliance.
disease-causing organisms, while alternatively depicting that a risk assessment to
protect plant life and health must show the likelihood of entry, establishment, or
spread of a pest or disease and the associated biological and economic
consequences). Two Article 5 provisions are influenced by other principles of the
SPS Agreement. First, Article 2.2 (scientific justification) informs Article 5.1, which
contains the basic requirement that members base measures on risk assessments;
Article 5.1 can thus be viewed as a “specific application” of the scientific obligations
contained in Article 2.2. EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 180. The Appellate Body
emphasized in EC-Hormones that “Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should constantly be read
together.” Id. Second, a violation of Article 5.5 necessarily implicates a violation of
Article 2.3 (non-discrimination), because Article 5.5 embodies the nondiscrimination principle with respect to the risk assessment requirements. Appellate
Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, ¶¶ 243-255,
WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Australia-Salmon]. In Australia-Salmon,
the Appellate Body explored the connection between these two non-discrimination
provisions of the SPS Agreement and concluded that a violation of Article 2.3 can be
established by “following the complex and indirect route worked out and elaborated
by Article 5.5.” Id. ¶ 252. The Appellate Body bolstered this conclusion with
reference to its earlier discussion in the EC-Hormones case, where it held that Article
5.5 marks out “a particular route leading to the same destination set out in Article
2.3” but stressed that Article 5.5 is not the only route leading to a violation of the first
sentence of Article 2.3. Id. ¶ 252 n.195 (citing EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 212).
86. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5; EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 193
(stating that Article 5, when properly read in conjunction with Article 2.2 (scientific
principle), requires that the results of the risk assessment must warrant, or
reasonably support, the sanitary measure in question and the corresponding level of
protection imposed by that measure).
87. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.8 (permitting a member to request
justification in the form of a risk assessment for a measure if the member believes the
measure constrains, or has the potential to constrain, its exports); see also supra note
84 and accompanying text (detailing the procedure to impose a higher level of
protection when measures depart from international standards).
88. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 11 (describing the right to
consultation and dispute settlement under the Agreement). To date, there have
been four cases fully disputed in the WTO for violations of the SPS Agreement. In
each, the WTO member was found to have violated the Agreement. See Japan–Apples,
supra note 22, ¶¶ 243-244 (finding that Japan’s phytosanitary measure to restrict the
import of apples contaminated with Erwinia Amylovora, or fire blight, violated Articles
2.2 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement); Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting
Agricultural Products, ¶¶ 143-144, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter
Japan-Testing] (holding that Japan’s prohibition on the import of eight agricultural
products, on the basis that these foods may be a host for codling moth, is a
phytosanitary measure that violates Articles 2.2 and 5.1, and also Article 7 of the
Agreement (requiring members to notify other WTO members of any changes in
their sanitary or phytosanitary measures in an effort to promote transparency
between nations)); Australia–Salmon, supra note 85, ¶¶ 279-280 (concluding that
Australia’s import ban on fresh, chilled, or frozen salmon caught in the Pacific
Ocean is a sanitary measure violating Articles 2.2, 2.3, 5.1, and 5.5 of the SPS
Agreement); EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 253 (determining that the European

BOISEN_OFFTOPRINTER

686

1/30/2007 12:45:09 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:3
89

The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) provides a
quasi-judicial forum where members may bring disputes and resolve
90
A
claims of non-compliance with any of the WTO Agreements.
WTO member can, therefore, bring a dispute against the United
States alleging that Title III of the Bioterrorism Act violates U.S.
91
obligations under the SPS Agreement.
The case of EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) (“EC-Hormones”) is relevant to the present issue because it
considered, and resolved under the dispute settlement system,
92
allegations that the European Community (“EC”) had violated the
SPS Agreement by discriminating against foreign imports and
maintaining a sanitary measure without support from a risk
Community violated Articles 3.3 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement); see also Kennedy,
supra note 22, at 91-100 (providing an overview of both the Panel and Appellate Body
decisions in the cases of Australia-Salmon, EC–Hormones, and Japan-Testing).
89. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
90. See William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded its Authority?
A Consideration of Deference Shown by the System to Member Government Decisions and its Use
of Issue-Avoidance Techniques, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 79, 79 (2001) (asserting that the DSU
is the hallmark of the WTO system and is used extensively by WTO members to
resolve trade disputes with other members). See generally Kim Van der Borght, The
Review of the WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current
Debate, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1223 (1999) (describing the development of the
dispute settlement mechanism as a fundamental change from the former GATT to
the current WTO system and reporting that, generally, WTO members who have
employed the dispute settlement system to resolve trade disputes are satisfied with its
operation); WTO Webpage, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
2006) (describing the dispute settlement process as the “central pillar of the [WTO]
multilateral trading system” and further defining a dispute as “when one country
adopts a trade policy measure or takes some action that one or more fellow-WTO
members considers to be breaking the WTO agreements, or to be a failure to live up
to obligations”). There are two levels of review in the dispute settlement system.
Initially, there is a trial-like review by a Panel, which issues a report with its findings.
A WTO member can then appeal a decision of the Panel to the Appellate Body, the
highest level of review in the dispute settlement system, which will issue a final
determination. WTO Webpage, supra.
91. Cf. Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Complaint by the United States, ¶ 8.51, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter
EC-Hormones, Complaint by the United States] (declaring that the complaining WTO
member in any dispute under the DSU bears the initial burden of making a prima
facie case of non-compliance with the Agreement).
92. The European Community (“EC”) is the predecessor to what is now
commonly known as the European Union. See RANDY CHARLES EPPING, A BEGINNER’S
GUIDE TO THE WORLD ECONOMY 111-14 (Vintage Books 3d ed. 2001) (1992)
(describing the birth of the European Union). Epping traces the history of
European economic unification from the original European Coal and Steel
Community, formed in 1957 as a common market for steel and coal among six
Western European nations, to the current free-trade “megazone” that is the
European Union. Id.
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93

assessment.
Concerned about possible health dangers, the EC
imposed an import ban on all meat products from animals injected
94
with growth hormones. After both the United States and Canada
challenged the measure, the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones
considered principally whether the EC had violated the SPS
Agreement’s principles of harmonization, discrimination, and risk
95
assessment.
In the context of this Comment, the Appellate Body’s construction
and interpretation of the obligations under Article 2.3 and 5.5 (nondiscrimination) and Article 5.1 (risk assessment) are particularly
important. The case outlined a three-part test to determine whether
a measure unjustifiably discriminates against other members in

93. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1-8 (introducing the issues on appeal to
the Appellate Body). The Appellate Body consolidated two Panel Reports, resolving
complaints lodged against the EC by the United States and Canada respectively, into
one case at the appellate level because both Panels consisted of the same three Panel
members and considered the identical issue: that of the legitimacy of the import ban
on hormone-treated meat products. See id. ¶ 1; see also Panel Report, EC Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48/
R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Hormones, Complaint by Canada]; ECHormones, Complaint by the United States, supra note 91. See generally Victor, supra note
35, at 898-904 (outlining the specific findings of both of the Panels and the Appellate
Body with respect to the EC import ban on meat products).
94. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1-5 (laying out the facts on appeal); ECHormones, Complaint by the United States, supra note 91, ¶¶ II.26-33 (describing the
events that prompted the EC ban, beginning with the growing, illegal use of
dethylstilboestrol (DES) in veal production operations in France, and corresponding
European concerns about the health-related risks that might stem from the use of
such hormones).
95. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 157-177 (examining the Panels’ findings
that the EC ban was a more stringent measure than the relevant international
standard and, thus, violated the harmonization principles in Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of
the SPS Agreement); id. ¶¶ 178-209 (discussing the SPS Agreement’s requirement
that measures be based on a risk assessment under Article 5 of the Agreement); id.
¶¶ 210-246, (reviewing the Panels’ determinations that the EC ban violated the SPS
Agreement by discriminating against foreign industry). The Appellate Body’s
discussion of the non-discrimination and risk assessment principles is pertinent to
this Comment. However, its examination of the principle of harmonization, and
explicit reversal of the Panels’ holdings on this point, is “perhaps its single most
important ruling on SPS-related issues.” Victor, supra note 35, at 900. Victor
explains that the Appellate Body overturned the Panels’ interpretations, which would
have required sanitary measures to conform to international standards, in favor of a
“more common-sense definition . . . [that] a measure can be based on international
standards without conforming” to them, thus allowing member countries
significantly more flexibility to implement domestic measures. Id. (emphasis added).
While the Appellate Body reversed a finding of an Article 3.3 violation on this basis,
it ultimately concluded that the EC measure was, in fact, inconsistent with Article 3.3
of the Agreement because of the interrelation between the harmonization and risk
assessment principles and because of its conclusion that Article 5.1 was violated. See
EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 209; see also infra note 228 (explaining the interactions
between Article 3 harmonization and Article 5 risk assessment).
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96

violation of Articles 2.3 and 5.5.
EC-Hormones also set forth a
framework to analyze a member’s obligation to justify sanitary
97
measures with a supportive risk assessment under Article 5.1. The
Appellate Body ultimately determined that the EC import ban did
98
not discriminate against foreign industry, yet it concluded that the
measure violated the SPS Agreement because it was not supported by
99
a proper risk assessment. This Comment proceeds to analyze Title
III under the SPS Agreement using EC-Hormones as a guide through
the WTO dispute settlement process. Analysis of the Title and
analogy to EC-Hormones will demonstrate how Title III violates Articles
2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement by discriminating against foreign

96. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 210-215 (deriving the following three-part
test from the text of the SPS Agreement, which determines that Article 5.5 has been
violated if: (1) the member failed to require comparable levels of protection in
comparable situations; (2) the application of varied levels of protection in
comparable situations resulted in arbitrary or unjustifiable differences; and (3) the
arbitrary or unjustifiable differences resulted in discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade). Under this holding, all three elements of the test must be
satisfied to sustain a violation of Article 5.5. Id. ¶ 215; but cf. WTO Website, Dispute
Settlement System Training Module Chapter 7, Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate
Body Reports, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt
_e/c7s2p1_e.htm (explaining that, there is no rule of stare decisis (binding
precedent) in WTO proceedings and that the Appellate Body is not required
maintain the same legal interpretations it has advanced in the past). However, if the
past interpretation is persuasive and its reasoning sound, it is likely a panel or the
Appellate Body will subsequently follow it. Id.; see, e.g., Australia-Salmon, supra note
85, ¶ 252 n.195 (discussing and retaining the interpretation of EC-Hormones with
respect to the interplay between the non-discrimination and risk assessment Articles
of the Agreement).
97. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 178-209 (reviewing the Panels’ statutory
constructions with respect to Article 5, conducting its own examination of the
Article, and interpreting Article 5.1 to contain a two-part test that sanitary measures
be both procedurally and substantively “based on” a risk assessment conforming to
the additional requirements of Articles 5.2-5.6); see also infra Part II.B.2.b (outlining
the two-part test of Article 5.1).
98. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 246 (reversing the Panels’ conclusions that
the European Community acted inconsistently with Article 5.5 or violated the SPS
Agreement under that principle); see also Victor, supra note 35, at 903 (opining that
the Appellate Body deemed the third prong of the discrimination test, whether the
differences in levels of protection harmed trade, to be the most important in finding
that Article 5.5 was not violated); infra Part II.B.1 (comparing the discrimination
inherent in Title III regulations to the finding of the Appellate Body in the ECHormones case).
99. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 198-200, 208 (agreeing with the Panels
that the scientific evidence presented by the EC, purportedly to support the
hormone ban, merely represented general studies that failed to address the
particular risk at issue and, as such, the EC failed to advance “relevant
documentation” to support its import prohibition); see also infra note 213 and
accompanying text (describing the EC-Hormones holding with respect to risk
assessment and comparing that holding to the assessment of Title III’s compliance
with the SPS Agreement).
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food exporters and further violates the risk assessment requirement
100
of Article 5.1.
II. TITLE III VIOLATES U.S. TRADE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SPS
AGREEMENT AND FAILS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION AGAINST
THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM
Title III is subject to the SPS Agreement because it is a sanitary
measure and it adversely affects international trade by imposing high
101
costs on foreign exporters seeking access to the U.S. market.
102
Despite the FDA’s assertions to the contrary, Title III violates U.S.
trade obligations under the SPS Agreement.
First, Title III
discriminates against foreign exporters in violation of Articles 2.3 and
100. This comparison is also appropriate because the import ban at issue in ECHormones is analogous to Title III’s regulation of food imports. First, although Title
III is largely a responsive, and therefore innovative, measure to be regulated under
the SPS Agreement, it is comparable to the EC ban because both are designed to
minimize harmful additives in the food supply and to restrict trade as a result. See
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, pmbl., 116 Stat. 594, 594 (expressing that the Act’s purpose is to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism); id. §§ 301-336, 116 Stat. at 662-81
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)) (acting with
the goal to protect the safety and security of the food supply specifically, under the
auspices of the Act’s general goal of bioterrorism prevention and response); ECHormones, Complaint by the United States, supra note 91, ¶¶ 2.2-2.10 (describing the EC
Directives and banning three naturally occurring and three artificially-produced
hormones from being administered to farm animals). Second, highly publicized
health incidents instigated both measures. Compare id. ¶ 2.26 (explaining that the
EC ban responded to reports in the 1970s and 1980s of developmental problems in
children, suspected to be caused by hormone-injected meat, and that, as a result of a
subsequent consumer boycott of veal and other meat products that severely affected
the European market, one goal of the hormone ban was to restore confidence in the
market), with Hodge, supra note 2, at 254 (detailing how in the United States, the
2001 anthrax attacks ignited widespread concern about the threat of bioterrorism,
particularly because the letters were mailed to government and media members in
three states and the District of Columbia), and Fidler, supra note 2, at 10 (noting the
public coverage of the anthrax incidents and that the “nation watched” as the
situation unfolded and the government scrambled to respond).
See also
Research!America, supra note 13 (reporting that, shortly after the attacks and before
passage of the Bioterrorism Act, nearly ninety percent of Americans doubted the
government’s ability to prevent or respond to future biological attacks).
101. See infra Part II.A (analyzing Title III under the requirements of the SPS
Agreement and concluding that the measure is subject to the Agreement’s
jurisdiction).
102. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,897
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule); Prior Notice of
Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974, 58,981 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) (questioning Title III’s compliance with
international trade obligations, under comments to registration and prior notice
respectively, with each comment eliciting the same generic FDA response: “FDA is
aware of the international trade obligations . . . [and believes these regulations are]
consistent with these international obligations”).
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5.5 because it causes foreign industries to incur significantly
increased transaction costs in order to trade with the United States
103
and imposes procedural conditions on foreign facilities alone.
Second, because no risk assessment supports Title III, it further
104
violates Article 5.1 of the Agreement.
A. In an Effort to Protect Americans from Food Bioterrorism, Title III
Inadvertently Restricts International Trade and, Therefore, is Subject to the
SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement applies only to those sanitary measures that,
105
directly or indirectly, restrict international trade.
Therefore, one
must establish primarily that the protectionary measure in question,
in this case Title III, is a sanitary measure as defined in the
106
Agreement and then further demonstrate that the sanitary measure
107
negatively impacts trade. Title III is subject to the SPS Agreement
because it satisfies the SPS Agreement’s broad definition of a sanitary
measure and restricts free trade by imposing increased costs
exclusively on foreign food exporters.
Title III meets the definition of a sanitary measure as described in
the SPS Agreement because it aims to “protect human . . . life or
health . . . from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or
108
disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs.”
Title
III imposes dual levels of protection against bioterrorism: to prevent
an attack using biological agents from being realized, using
109
information provided in prior notice submissions and to respond
103. See infra Part II.B.1 (contending that Title III violates the three-part nondiscrimination test set forth in EC-Hormones).
104. See infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing Title III under the two-part framework also
announced in EC-Hormones and maintaining that the measure fails to satisfy Article
5.1 of the SPS Agreement).
105. SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.1.
106. See id. Annex A.1 (providing four alternative definitions, each of which
qualify as a sanitary or phytosanitary measure).
107. See Kennedy, supra note 22, at 83 (elaborating that the SPS Agreement
applies only to measures with direct or indirect effects on trade). Notice that benign
measures that ensure sanitary protection but do not harm international trade are not
subject to the SPS Agreement. SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.1.
108. SPS Agreement, supra note 19, Annex A.1(b) (emphasis added); see Aaron A.
Ostrovsky, Note, The New Codex Alimentarius Commission Standards for Food Created with
Modern Biotechnology: Implications for the EC GMO Framework’s Compliance with the SPS
Agreement, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 813, 823 (2004) (performing a similar analogy to
define the “Deliberate Release Directive,” a European Community regulation
pertaining to the production and movement of genetically modified foods within the
European Union, as an SPS measure subject to the SPS Agreement). Ostrovsky
explains that the EC ban on hormones qualifies as a sanitary measure under the
definition contained in Annex A, subparagraph (a). Id.
109. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (predicting that prior notice will aid
both prevention and response to bioterrorism activities by providing the Agency with
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effectively to limit the spread of diseased or infected food products,
110
using registration information and other administrative authority.
Although the SPS Agreement has traditionally been applied to
111
import bans on specific food products, nothing in the language,
context, or interpretation of the Agreement bars its application to
112
import controls affecting food products generally. So long as Title
III’s protective controls are intended to protect Americans and the
American food supply from the danger of deliberate contamination
and the use of biological toxins in food, it is immaterial how that level
of protection is achieved for the purpose of defining the title as a
113
sanitary measure. The overall purpose of the Bioterrorism Act—to
114
prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism —and the specific
mandate of Title III—to protect against the purposeful use of
115
biological contamination in the food supply —demonstrates that
Title III can be defined as a sanitary measure to protect human life
116
and health from the dangers of food bioterrorism.

increased information about food shipments imported into the United States, thus
allowing the Agency to preemptively respond to threats and prevent potential
contamination from entering the United States, or from being disseminated
throughout the United States).
110. See supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text (listing among the benefits of
registration that the provision will help the FDA deter and respond to bioterrorism,
thus protecting the American public from bioterrorist activities).
111. See, e.g., Australia-Salmon, supra note 85 (challenging Australia’s import ban
on Pacific salmon); EC-Hormones, supra note 25 (contesting the EC ban on growth
hormones in meat products).
112. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.1 (describing the broad subjects to
which the Agreement applies).
113. See id. Annex A.1 (defining sanitary measures broadly, without mention of
specific or traditional types of food regulation, such as import bans).
114. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
115. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, §§ 301-336, 116 Stat. 594, 662-81 (codified as amended
at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)) (clarifying its purpose in the title:
“Protecting Safety and Security of Food and Drug Supply”).
116. Title III alternatively qualifies as a sanitary measure under the SPS
Agreement, which includes approval procedures in the definition of sanitary
measures. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, Annex A.2; see also id. Annex C.1
(defining approval procedures expansively as procedures to check or ensure the
fulfillment of a sanitary measure). Only full compliance with Title III will make a
food product eligible for entry into the United States; thus, Title III is an approval
procedure under the Agreement. Consequently, Title III is a sanitary measure under
either the definition in Annex A.1(b) or under the approval procedure of Annex C.
Because the provisions applicable to approval procedures mirror those in the
broader Agreement, it is unnecessary to distinguish between the two definitions.
Compare id. Annex C.1(a) (“Members shall ensure . . . that: (a) such procedures are
undertaken and completed without undue delay and in no less favourable manner
for imported products than for like domestic products.”), with id. art. 2.3 (“Members
shall ensure that their sanitary . . . measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminate between Members . . . including between their own territory and that of
other Members.”). Hence, both the general Agreement and Annex C embrace the
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In addition to meeting the criteria of a sanitary measure, Title III’s
detrimental effect on international trade ultimately subjects it to the
Agreement’s jurisdiction. Title III is burdensome and costly for
117
foreign food facilities.
Registration and prior notice provisions
discriminate against foreign facilities, both by the letter of the
regulation and by the disparate costs imposed. Efficient businesses
118
operate in markets only where it is profitable to do so. Rather than
incur increased costs and administrative burdens for the privilege to
compete in the U.S. market, some foreign manufacturers may simply
119
cease exporting to the United States.
The FDA has acknowledged the disparate cost to foreign food
exporters imposed by registration and prior notice. Of the nearly
120
$330 million in projected first year registration costs, the FDA
estimates over ninety-three percent will be borne by foreign
121
122
This discrepancy only increases in subsequent years.
facilities.
notion that a member should not favor its domestic industry over foreign trading
industries.
117. Compare Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,949,
tbl.12 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule)
(summarizing the total annual cost to foreign food facilities to comply with
registration at $228,800,000), and Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 58,974, 59,046, tbl.25 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim
rule) (computing total annual prior notice costs to foreign food facilities at
$260,633,000), with Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,948,
tbl.11 (estimating domestic expenses as a result of registration at only $6,900,000).
Note that there is no corresponding expense to domestic food facilities as a result of
section 307 prior notice because this provision is applicable to foreign industry only.
118. See EPPING, supra note 92, at 9 (providing a basic snapshot of how
international trade operates and stressing that trade is a mechanism for wealth, as
“[n]o country would sell something abroad unless it could make a profit”).
119. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,943
(predicting that sixteen percent of food facilities will cease export to the United
States rather than comply with Title III provisions); cf. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Review
Urges U.S. to Head Off Protectionism; China Criticizes Port Reaction, 23 INT’L TRADE REP.
437, 437-38 (2006) (citing WTO’s past praises of the United States for its role as a
“key engine of global growth” in providing the world’s largest market for foreign
exporters, but current calls for the United States to reduce recent protectionist
regulation, including the Bioterrorism Act).
120. Note that this figure is much higher than the amount referenced supra in
note 7 with respect to registration costs. This is because the amount in note 7
reflects only the cost of the U.S. agent requirement of the registration provision,
while the above stated amount accounts for all costs associated with registration
compliance, including the U.S. agent costs, as well as expenses for the collection and
submission of registration information, periodic updates, and incidental costs of noncompliance. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,949, tbl.12.
121. See id. at 58,950, tbl.13 (condensing into table form a summary of the
predicted costs of registration to all affected food producers in the four years after
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The FDA also estimates that first year costs of prior notice, applicable
only to foreign industry, will top $360 million and it projects an
123
annual cost of $260 million thereafter. Therefore, in the first year
of implementation, foreign food exporters seeking access to the U.S.
124
market will be forced to pay almost $670 million just to comply with
125
Title III registration and prior notice.
While the FDA has modified some of its regulations in an effort to
126
reduce the costs of Title III compliance, these changes fail to fully
the implementation date). The total foreign share of first-year registration costs is
roughly $306 million. Id.
122. See id. (forecasting that the foreign share of registration costs will increase to
ninety-seven percent for each year predicted after the first year of implementation).
123. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,046, tbl.25
(summarizing the estimated costs of prior notice for the first year, and annual costs
thereafter).
124. See supra notes 121 and 123 and accompanying text (calculating the first-year
costs of $306 million for registration and $360 million for prior notice, totaling $666
million for first year Title III costs); Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 70 Fed.
Reg. 57,505, 57,507 (Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (finding that
the expense of hiring and maintaining a U.S. agent in order to comply with
registration will likely remain consistent at $165 million). Therefore, although the
costs of Title III compliance will drop after the first year, foreign facilities will still
incur expenses of approximately $425 million each year thereafter, which domestic
facilities will not incur. See supra text accompanying note 123 (providing the prior
notice figure, which, when added with the above amount of compliance with the U.S.
agent requirement, yields the approximate total yearly expenses of registration and
prior notice compliance).
125. This financial burden will disproportionately affect small business foreign
exporters who have fewer financial resources and ship lower quantities of imports
into the United States. As these businesses generally have tight monetary constraints,
many are likely to cease export to the U.S. rather than suffer the increased costs. See
Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,943 (estimating that of
the sixteen percent of firms predicted to cease export to the United States, most
facilities that will be affected are small businesses that annually export relatively few
items to the United States). In turn, the absence of these exporters from the U.S.
trade market will adversely affect domestic small business importers who will be
forced to find alternative sources of goods. See White House Fact Sheet: Opening
New Markets for America’s Small Businesses (Mar. 24, 2004), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040324-7.html (stating that ninety-seven
percent of all U.S. exporters are small to medium-sized businesses that likely rely on
small business foreign counterparts). See generally Onyango & Turvey, supra note 15
(reporting that small businesses within the United States fear the domestic economic
repercussions of the Bioterrorism Act if some foreign firms are forced out of
business).
126. See, e.g., Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,898 (noting
changes in registration regulations with regard to the definition of “food” and “farm”
and other general clarifications that will benefit all facilities required to register but
do nothing to alleviate the particular cost to foreign facilities of hiring and retaining
a U.S. agent); Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,981
(documenting that the FDA considered its action to reduce the timeframe for
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address foreign trade concerns. Foreign facilities are still responsible
for the costs of hiring a U.S. agent and submitting prior notice while
domestic facilities freely move shipments inside the United States
127
without financial burden.
Consequently, WTO members, whose
cries have fallen on deaf FDA ears, can claim that Title III, as a
sanitary measure that adversely affects international trade, violates
the SPS Agreement.
B. Title III Violates U.S. Trade Obligations to the WTO
Title III violates Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement by
128
arbitrarily discriminating against the foreign food industry.
Because the measure is not supported by a risk assessment, Title III
129
Furthermore, plausible
also violates Article 5.1 of the Agreement.
130
arguments can be made, but which are not the subject of this
Comment, that Title III also disregards the remaining major
131
principles under the Agreement of scientific justification,
132
133
equivalence, and harmonization.
submission of prior notice as one of the changes made to minimize the impact of the
requirement.
127. See supra note 117 (contrasting the financial burden on foreign facilities with
the relative financial freedom of domestic industry).
128. See infra Part II.B.1.
129. See infra Part II.B.2.
130. These arguments are valid, but speculative. For example, with respect to
harmonization, the WTO could find that the Bioterrorism Act’s deviations from
existing standards do not impose higher, but instead comparable, levels of
protection. Member’s must base measures on international standards and guidelines,
but are only required to justify higher levels of sanitary protection under Article 3.3.
SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.3.
131. The FDA analogized to scientific evidence gathered from past incidents of
accidental contamination to express the risk of bioterrorism. See, e.g., Registration of
Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,953, tbl.15 (using data from previous
accidental food outbreaks, including incidents caused by imported foods, to show
the possible costs and risks of a bioterrorist strike against the food supply). However,
Title III’s measures cannot be justified under Article 2.2 without scientific data
signifying the threat and effect of intentional contamination. This failure to support
Title III with scientific data pertaining specifically to deliberate contamination
arguably violates Article 2.1. See infra note 217 (highlighting the difference between
intentional and accidental food contamination).
132. The FDA has indicated unequivocally that it will not allow any comparable
communications link, such as a foreign embassy or designated agent living abroad, to
fulfill the U.S. agent requirement. See, e.g., Registration of Food Facilities Under the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. at 58,915 (requesting that the FDA allow the agent for foreign facilities to
be located outside the United States, to which the FDA responded that the
requirement that the agent be physically present in the United States is “consistent
with the plain language of the Bioterrorism Act” and is further consistent with FDA’s
regulation of other imported products, such as drugs and medical devices). The
Agency has also affirmed that any imported food must submit prior notice to gain
entry to the U.S. market. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public
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1. Title III discriminates against foreign industry in violation of Articles 2.3
& 5.5 of the SPS Agreement
Title III violates Articles 2.3 and 5.5 because it arbitrarily imposes
unequal levels of sanitary protection in comparable situations and
acts to restrict foreign trade and discriminate against foreign
industry. Articles 2.3 and 5.5 work in tandem to prohibit WTO
members from maintaining unjustifiably different levels of protection
134
These two provisions of the Agreement
in comparable situations.
embody the broader goal of achieving consistency in the application
135
Under the three part test
of sanitary measures on a global scale.
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 58,974, 59,016 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule)
(rejecting a comment that a waiver should be adopted for imports that are deemed
safe but have completed only partial prior notice and stating that such a waiver
would be “antithetical” to the goal of prior notice and insisting that admission will be
refused to any product with incomplete prior notice). Therefore, any exporting
country’s domestic measure that achieves the same level of sanitary protection
against bioterrorism through means other than the use of a U.S. agent and prior
notice will likely be rejected by the FDA. This implicit prohibition on the use of any
equivalent measure designed to prevent and respond to bioterrorism by WTO
members directly contradicts the equivalence principle contained in Article 4.2. SPS
Agreement, supra note 19, art. 4.2.
133. Critics could make an additional argument that Title III imposes a higher
level of sanitary protection than the two relevant Codex Alimentarius Commission
standards and, thus, is not fully harmonized with international standards. Title III
imposes a higher level of protection than the standard for the exchange of
information in emergency situations by requiring foreign facilities to designate an
agent specifically for the purpose of emergency communication. See Principles and
Guidelines for the Exchange of Information in Food Safety Emergency Situations,
Codex Alimentarius Commission Guideline, CAC/GL 19-1995, revised in 2004,
available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/36/CXG_019_
2004e.pdf (emphasizing that the “global nature of food trade requires that
[emergency] communication occur between nations at the appropriate governmental
level”) (emphasis added). Title III also adds another level of protection to the
international standard for routine food rejections by refusing the importation of
pure, uncontaminated foods merely for a lack of technical reporting under
registration or prior notice. See Guidelines for the Exchange of Information Between
Countries on Rejections of Imported Food, Codex Alimentarius Commission
Guideline, CAC/GL 25-1997, available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/
download/standards/353/CXG_025e.pdf (noting that the primary reason for
imported food rejections is usually food impurities in content or packaging).
Accordingly, it is possible that Title III violates, outright, Article 3.3. See also infra
note 228 (concluding that Title III violates Article 5.1 of the Agreement and
discussing the interrelation between this finding and the harmonization principle
established in Article 3.3).
134. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, at ¶ 212 (reading Article 5.5 in context with
Article 2.3 and finding they elaborate the same objectives); see also supra note 85
(explaining the interrelation between Article 2.3 and 5.5 in greater detail).
135. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 213 (emphasizing that the objective of
Article 5.5 is to achieve “consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection”). The Appellate Body stressed that the
goal set is not “absolute or perfect consistency,” but that over time consistency will
develop with the continued administration of the SPS Agreement and enforcement
against arbitrary or unjustifiable inconsistencies. Id.
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enunciated in EC-Hormones, a member has violated Article 5.5, and by
association Article 2.3, if: (1) the member applies different levels of
protection in comparable situations; (2) the application of the
different levels of protection is arbitrary or unjustifiable; and
136
(3) either discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade results.
A dispute for discrimination under the SPS Agreement will consider
137
each of these three elements.
Title III’s registration and prior notice requirements impose
disproportionate levels of protection on foreign and domestic food
producers. To examine and compare these levels of protection,
there are two relevant inquiries: the level of basic protection against
contaminated foods under prior notice and the level of responsive
protection via increased communication under registration.
Title III imposes different levels of preventative protection between
imported and domestic food products. Prior notice is required for
foreign imports to prevent contaminated foods from entering the
138
U.S. market.
However, no equivalent reporting procedure is
required of domestic facilities before their food products move within
139
the United States. This artificial distinction appears to rest on the
assumption that imported products are more likely to be used as a
vehicle for bioterrorism, an assumption that the FDA does not fully
140
justify or support.
Domestic facilities are required to establish and maintain certain
records under section 306 of the Bioterrorism Act—Maintenance and
141
Inspection of Records for Foods (“Records Maintenance”) —but
136. See id. ¶ 214 (elaborating the three-part test stemming from Article 5.5). In
other cases, the Appellate Body has considered factors in addition to this basic threepart test. See Davey, supra note 90, at 91 (imparting two additional factors considered
in Australia-Salmon: “the change in the conclusion between the draft risk assessment
and final risk assessment; and the absence of measures controlling internal fish
movements within Australia”).
137. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 215 (describing the three-part test as
cumulative and, as a result, emphasizing that each condition must be fulfilled in
order to sustain a violation of Article 5.5); see also supra note 96 (explaining that,
while prior decisions are not binding in the WTO system, they are given deference if
persuasive and well-reasoned).
138. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 381 (West 2006).
139. See id. (limiting its provisions to “the case of an article of food that is being
imported or offered for import into the United States”).
140. See infra notes 218-219 and accompanying text (concluding, under the
analysis of the risk assessment principle, that Title III maintains an artificial
foreign/domestic distinction that is neither explicitly supported by either FDA or
Congress, nor is implicitly supported by data of past incidents of intentional food
contamination in the United States, which all suggest bioterrorist incidents are more
likely to involve domestic persons using domestic food products to carry out attacks).
141. See § 306, 116 Stat. at 669-70 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.A. (West 2006)) (requiring any domestic individual, partnership or
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this regulation is not an equivalent burden on domestic industry.
Many companies keep such records in the normal course of
142
Moreover, these records need only be documented, but
business.
not continually submitted, to the FDA and have no bearing on a
143
domestic facility’s ability to transport shipments between states. In
addition, while non-compliance with both prior notice and records
144
maintenance is a prohibited act, only failure to provide prior notice
145
results in seizure and detainment of the food shipment.
Accordingly, Title III imposes a stricter level of protection on food
imports than it does on corresponding domestic products.
Title III further applies different levels of protection to domestic
and foreign food manufacturers in terms of communication
requirements. While registration requires both domestic and foreign
146
food facilities to designate an emergency contact, the U.S. agent
147
constraints are more burdensome than the domestic requirements.

corporation that manufactures, processes, packs, transports, distributes, receives,
holds, or imports food to record the immediate source and recipient of all food
goods).
142. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,562, 71,566 (Dec. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 11) (describing that
the final rule merely requires what many businesses keep as records during normal
business recordkeeping and that the Agency recognizes this as an attempt to
minimize the burden of additional documentation).
143. See id. (reiterating that if a facility’s existing recordkeeping system already
contains the required information under records maintenance, no additional
conditions are required and a facility need only keep such records available for a
possible inspection).
144. See FDA Prior Notice of Imported Food, 21 C.F.R. § 1.284 (2006) (making
failure to submit prior notice a prohibited act under § 301(ee) of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331(ee) (2000))); FDA
Establishment, Maintenance, and Availability of Records, 21 C.F.R § 1.363 (2006)
(designating failure to comply with records maintenance as a prohibited act as well).
145. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.283(a)(1)(i)-(iii) (explaining that imported food will be
held within the port of arrival if prior notice is not provided). But see 21 C.F.R
§ 1.363 (including no corresponding provision in the regulation of section 306
Records Maintenance).
146. See FDA Registration of Food Facilities, 21 C.F.R. § 1.232(e) (2006)
(expecting a domestic facility to include the emergency contact phone number with
the information submitted for FDA registration); id. § 1.232(d) (asking foreign
facilities to include the emergency contact phone number of their U.S. agent in
registration); see also id. § 1.233(e) (allowing foreign facilities to designate an
emergency contact other than their U.S. agent, but explaining that the FDA will
consider the agent the default emergency contact unless otherwise indicated).
147. Compare Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,923,
58,927 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (noting
FDA changes in the interim rule that lessen the emergency contact information
requirements and alleviate the burden for domestic facilities by allowing them to
utilize “already established emergency procedures” in providing emergency contact
information for FDA purposes), with id. at 58,915-16 (suggesting multiple changes in
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Domestic facilities are permitted to use existing employees in the
149
role of emergency contact, submit general contact information
150
instead of the name of a specific individual, and can further choose
151
to designate an emergency contact at the corporate level. Quite the
opposite, foreign firms are specifically constrained to choose an
emergency contact for each facility who is physically present in the
152
United States and who must be expressly named.
the U.S. agent requirements to minimize the burden on foreign entities, only to have
each dismissed by the FDA).
148. The use of existing employees allows domestic facilities to rotate different
employees internally through the role of emergency contact without updating
registration information, while foreign facilities must update their registration to
reflect any change in their designated U.S. agent most likely to be the default
emergency contact under 21 C.F.R. § 1.283(d). But see Registration of Food Facilities
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,915 (allowing foreign facilities to use existing contacts in
the United States as their U.S. agent, in response to a comment that the U.S. agent
requirement is “onerous and potentially trade-restrictive”). However, only ten
percent of foreign facilities are estimated to have such contacts readily available that
would qualify as a U.S. agent. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 70 Fed. Reg.
57,505, 57,507 (Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20); see Registration of
Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,943 (estimating that, at the time, ten
percent of foreign facilities currently had U.S. representatives or existing business
contacts within the United States who could function as the U.S. agent for that
facility); cf. id. at 58,916 (limiting the ability of foreign facilities to use government
officials in the United States to act as U.S. agents because of concerns that the duties
of the U.S. agent may conflict with the duties of foreign government representation).
149. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,378, 5,384
(proposed Feb. 3, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (permitting domestic
facilities latitude in determining how to comply with the domestic emergency contact
requirement).
150. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,923
(modifying the emergency contact requirements so that domestic facilities do not
need to designate an individual if the FDA can contact a live person representing the
facility twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week).
151. See id. (consenting to a comment that proposed that domestic emergency
contact information may be maintained at the corporate headquarters, if determined
appropriate for that facility). Ironically, as a result of Title III’s definition of the term
“domestic,” a facility located in the United States but owned by an international
corporation could be allowed to maintain an emergency contact on foreign soil, at
that facility’s headquarters, while foreign owned food facilities are forced to maintain
such contacts within the United States. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d (West 2006) (defining a
domestic facility by geographic location, as “a facility located in any of the States or
Territories” of the United States, not by ownership of the facility).
152. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,923 (listing
registration requirements for foreign facilities, making mandatory the inclusion of an
agent located in the United States); FDA Registration of Food Facilities, 21 C.F.R.
§ 1.232(d) (2006) (explaining the requirements for a foreign facilities’ emergency
contact); see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (elaborating on the U.S.
agent requirements for foreign facilities).
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Additionally, registration requirements will be enforced exclusively
against foreign facilities. Food offered for import from a foreign
facility that is not registered correctly will be detained and refused
153
entry, but domestic facilities suffer no corresponding consequence
154
for the same failure. Registration therefore requires a stricter level
of protection on foreign food producers by requiring a designated
U.S. agent and by seizing and detaining foreign food products from
unregistered or improperly registered facilities.
It is not sufficient to merely show Title III’s imposition of different
levels of protection. Under the three-part EC-Hormones test, these
differences must also be arbitrary or unjustified and discriminate
155
against foreign trade in order to violate the SPS Agreement.
The different levels of protection imposed by Title III are arbitrary
because they are based solely on a superficial foreign/domestic
distinction. Recent terrorist attacks on the United States have been
156
perpetrated by both domestic and foreign individuals,
and
previously documented bioterrorism attacks in the United States have
largely been deployed against domestic food sources, by domestic
157
persons. There is little compelling evidence to suggest that foreign
153. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 381 (West 2006); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1.241(c); supra
note 47 (describing the various consequences of failing to register, including seizure
and detention of the imported shipment or refusal of admission into the United
States). As a result of FDA detention, perishable food may spoil or customers may be
frustrated by late or canceled shipments, causing foreign facilities to incur incidental
costs such as the loss of valuable business contracts.
154. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 381 (West 2006) (mandating consequences for failing to
register only for imported food products).
155. See supra text accompanying note 136 (explaining the three-part test); see also
EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 219-246 (describing the final two parts of the threepart test and applying the test to determine if the different EC levels of protection
were arbitrary and unjustified and a violation of Article 5.5).
156. Two visible attacks on the World Trade Center in New York demonstrate the
acts of external, foreign terrorists. See Alexander, supra note 13, at 71-72 (describing
the activities of foreign-based al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, including the 1993
attack on the World Trade Center); Christopher Drew & Judith Miller, A Nation
Challenged: Washington Concerned By Moves of Saudis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at B4
(reporting that the majority of the suspected September 11th hijackers were of Saudi
Arabian descent). However, the United States also has a history of domestic terrorist
attacks. See Elizabeth Gleick, Who Are They? The Oklahoma Blast Reveals the Paranoid
Life and Times of Accused Bomber Timothy McVeigh and his Right-Wing Associates, TIME,
May 1, 1995, at 44 (providing a history of the suspects in the Oklahoma City
bombing—Timothy McVeigh, originally from New York, and the Nichols brothers,
originally from Michigan—which has been described as the worst incident of
domestic terrorism in the United States); Frank Rich, Connect the Dots, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1995, at E15 (arguing that the domestic opposition to abortion clinics in the
United States will join the Oklahoma City bombing in the chapter of the “history of
home-grown American terrorism in the 1990’s”); see also Richard Lacayo, How Safe is
Safe? Americans Must Decide How Much Freedom They Are Willing To Trade For More
Security, TIME, May 1, 1995, at 68 (describing how Americans are now coping with the
real threat of domestic terrorism).
157. Infra note 219.
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imports are more susceptible than equivalent domestic food products
158
for use as bioterrorist agents, or that communication with foreign
facilities in emergency situations would be significantly more
159
problematic than similar domestic communication.
This mirrors the finding in EC-Hormones, where different levels of
protection were applied based on a distinction between the intended
purposes for administration of the hormone and whether the
160
hormones present were naturally occurring or purposefully added.

158. The FDA is apparently most concerned with foreign food imports. See
Frederick Golden, What’s Next? It Could Be Smallpox, Botulism, or Other Equally Deadly
Biological Agents, TIME, Nov. 5, 2001, at 44 (relaying the concerns of then Secretary of
Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, about the susceptibility of the
nation’s food supply to contamination, focusing on imports in particular). If a
bioterrorist attack is planned and carried out by a foreign bioterrorist, it is
reasonable to assume that foreign food sources would be used because they are more
accessible to the bioterrorist. However, the events of September 11th proved that
foreign terrorists often plan attacks from within a targeted nation’s border and
utilize domestic resources. See Kevin Sack & Jim Yardley, After the Attacks: U.S. Says
Hijackers Lived in the Open with Deadly Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A1
(reporting that several men suspected by the FBI to have carried out the September
11th attacks received flight training at the Flight Safety Academy in Vero Beach,
Florida); see also Joel Achenbach, ‘You Never Imagine’ A Hijacker Next Door, WASH. POST,
Sept. 16, 2001, at A1 (detailing how some of the September 11th hijackers had lived
in the United States for years prior to the attacks, seemingly “act[ing] like normal
human beings, nothing abnormal”). The implicit FDA assumption that foreign
imports carry a greater bioterrorism risk must, therefore, be premised upon a belief
that the United States faces terrorism primarily perpetrated by foreign individuals
using foreign, not domestic, sources. This is generally true given the United States’
most recent experience with terrorism. Long-term, however, for both this country
and most others, terrorist acts are carried out by dissent domestic groups. See
Alexander, supra note 13, at 65-67 (describing both historical terrorism and
contemporary terrorism, using examples from various regions of the world, as
involving acts of domestic individuals uprising against a domestic government).
Alexander explains that only recently has terrorism taken on an international
dimension. Id. at 66. Additionally, the assumption that bioterrorists, as a particular
subset of terrorists, are likely to be foreign individuals does not comport with the
FDA’s experience with bioterrorism thus far. See supra note 157 and accompanying
text.
159. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,952
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (requiring more
complete emergency contact information from foreign food facilities because of past
difficulties contacting facilities due to incomplete information in agency records).
However, presuming that communication to foreign facilities broke down as a result
of difficulties in reaching the actual facility, not in contacting the foreign embassy,
the same communication difficulties would just transfer to the U.S. agent. Id. The
FDA could achieve the same communications objective by holding foreign facilities
to the domestic requirements—allowing them to designate an internal emergency
contact on call twenty-four hours a day, with the added proviso that the contact be
fluent in English. This would eliminate any problems due to language barriers or
time zone constraints.
160. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 218 (outlining five different levels of
protection that the EC applied, as identified by the Panel). These levels of protection
include:
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Notably, the Appellate Body found the distinction maintained
between the administration of growth hormones in cows, on the one
hand, and the use of feed additives to enhance development in pigs,
161
on the other hand, was “unjustifiable in the sense of Article 5.5.”
Both substances had carcinogenic characteristics, and were therefore
162
potentially harmful to human life and health.
Similarly, there is no fundamental difference between a food
product, such as an apple, that is grown domestically and shipped
within the United States and one that is produced internationally and
shipped into the United States.
The only distinguishing
163
characteristic of the apples is the country of origin.
Because both
apples have virtually identical composition, each is equally susceptible
to biological contamination. Thus, similar to the finding in ECHormones, the maintenance of different levels of protection under
Title III is not rationally justified, but rather arbitrary.
Additionally, Title III’s arbitrary imposition of different levels of
protection discriminates against foreign industry and discourages
trade. Despite its recognition of an arbitrary distinction, the
Appellate Body in EC-Hormones determined that the EC’s prohibition
of growth hormones was not discriminatory because it applied equally
•
•
•
•

the level of protection in respect of natural hormones when used
for growth promotion;
the level of protection in respect of natural hormones occurring
endogenously [or naturally] in meat and other foods;
the level of protection in respect of natural hormones when used
for therapeutic or zootechnical purposes;
the levels of protection in respect of synthetic . . . hormones when
used for growth promotes; and
the level of protection in response of carbadox and olaquindox.

•
Id.
161. Id. ¶ 235.
162. See id. ¶¶ 226-235 (highlighting the parallel “genotoxic” and carcinogenic
nature of carbadox, olaquindox and growth hormones and rejecting the EC’s various
attempts to distinguish these substances or prove a justifiable distinction). The Panel
found an arbitrary distinction between the maintenance of different standards for
artificially injected hormones and naturally-occurring hormones, which the
Appellate Body explicitly overturned. Id. ¶ 220. Unlike the Panel, the Appellate
Body concluded there was a fundamental distinction between natural and synthetic
hormones and stressed that the regulation of all naturally occurring hormones,
present in virtually every animal producing subsequent meat products, would require
an “absurd” level of administrative oversight. Id. ¶ 221 (describing that the oversight
would “entail[] such a comprehensive and massive governmental intervention in
nature” that it would impede upon the everyday, ordinary lives of the people). With
respect to hormones administered for growth promotion purposes and therapeutic
or zootechincal purposes, the Appellate Body held that there existed also an
inherent and justifiable difference between these administration purposes. Id.
¶¶ 223-225.
163. Cf. infra note 219 and accompanying text (arguing that a distinction based on
country of origin is unjustified).
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to beef produced within the European Union and beef imports.
With respect to Title III, however, the different levels of protection
are applied only according to the origin of the food product. This
substantial difference in levels of protection demonstrates plain
165
discrimination.
This discrimination, in turn, restricts trade by
166
creating considerable costs for foreign exporters. Therefore, Title
III violates Articles 2.3 and 5.5 because it arbitrarily and unjustifiably
discriminates against foreign industry and restricts international
trade.
2.

Title III is not based on a proper risk assessment under Article 5.1
Despite repeated demands for a risk assessment to support the
167
Bioterrorism Act, neither the United States nor the FDA has made
such an assessment available for the purposes of the SPS

164. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 244-246 (concluding that the Panel erred
in determining that there was an arbitrary or unjustifiable difference in the levels of
EC protection that resulted in discrimination on foreign industry).
165. See Report of the Appellate Body, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 18-31,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (exploring the
different levels of taxation imposed on domestic and imported products and
arguing, based on a parallel provision of the GATT, that significant differences in
levels of protection may be sufficient to result in discrimination on trade); cf. ECHormones, supra note 25, ¶ 236 (considering and rejecting the Panel’s conclusion,
based on Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, that different protection alone may
prove discrimination under the SPS Agreement, but acknowledging that it is still an
important factor). Indeed, this may have been the most important factor considered
in EC-Hormones. See Victor, supra note 35, at 903 (reviewing the Appellate Body’s
findings with respect to the discrimination principle and arguing that the third
factor, whether an arbitrary difference in protection harmed trade, was most relevant
considering the SPS Agreement’s objective to reduce trade barriers).
166. See supra Part II.A (concluding that Title III has an adverse impact on
international trade because it imposes considerable costs on foreign facilities alone);
see also supra notes 120, 124 (explaining the difference between the total cost of
foreign compliance with registration and the separate cost for the U.S. agent
requirement and providing an estimate of total annual costs to comply with
registration and prior notice). Compare Establishment and Maintenance of Records
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,562, 71,612, tbl.1 (Dec. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 11) (predicting recurring annual costs on domestic facilities for records
maintenance, in addition to normal business recordkeeping, at $123 million), with
Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974, 59,046, tbl.25 (Oct. 10,
2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) (forecasting recurring annual
costs of $260 million on foreign facilities for prior notice; thus demonstrating that
prior notice is more than twice as costly as the domestic records maintenance
requirement).
167. See, e.g., European Commission, Comments of the European Commission on
implementing rule of US Bioterrorism Act, Registration of Food Facilities, Apr. 4,
2003, at 1, http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/reg_food_fac_en.pdf
(“The U.S. should provide such a risk assessment as requested by the SPS Agreement
to both justify the proposed measure and ensure that any potential risks are
addressed in an effective and proportionate manner.”).
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168

Agreement. The importance of a valid, supportive risk assessment
cannot be overstated. All four cases disputed under the SPS
Agreement focused on the need for, and the lack of, a proper risk
assessment in finding against the domestic legislation under
169
consideration.
The FDA has published a risk assessment concerning food
170
terrorism.
However, the purpose of this assessment is to
communicate the risk of foodborne illness from acts of food
terrorism and incidents of unintentional contamination to the
171
American public, not to comply with the SPS Agreement. Thus, the
United States has failed to comply with Article 5 of the SPS
Agreement because it has produced no specific risk assessment, or, to
172
public knowledge, performed an assessment,
for the express
173
purpose of supporting the Bioterrorism Act.
168. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.8 (requiring WTO members to
respond to requests for justification of trade restrictive measures by providing
supportive risk assessments).
169. See Japan–Apples, supra note 22, ¶¶ 189-216, 243(d) (discussing arguments
that Japan violated Article 5.1 and concluding that the analysis presented by Japan
failed to satisfy the definition of “risk assessment” established in Annex A, paragraph
4 of the SPS Agreement); Japan–Testing, supra note 88, ¶¶ 109-117, 143(f) (evaluating
arguments that Japan’s testing requirement for certain fruits (apricots, pears, plums,
and quinces) violated Article 5.1 and finding the measure was not based on a risk
assessment, therefore breaching the SPS Agreement); Australia–Salmon, supra note
85, ¶¶ 42-54, 112-178, 279(c)-(d) (reviewing claims that Australia’s salmon import
violated Article 5.1 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement and finding that Australia
breached both Articles due to the lack of proper risk assessment); EC-Hormones, supra
note 25, ¶¶ 82-96, 178-246, 253 (considering the Panel’s finding that the EC had
violated numerous provisions of Article 5 and ultimately deciding that the EC
violated only Article 5.1 because its measure was not substantively based on a risk
assessment of hormone-treated beef); see also Davey, supra note 90, at 92 (stating that
“the major issue in SPS cases so far has been a failure to conduct a risk assessment or
base a measure on the assessment”).
170. See Risk Assessment for Food Terrorism and Other Food Safety Concerns, 68
Fed. Reg. 59,078 (Oct. 10, 2003) (notice) (announcing the availability of the FDA
Risk Assessment concerning food terrorism in an effort to inform the public and
improve the Agency’s “ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to an incident of
food sabotage”).
171. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. I (stating that the purpose of the
FDA Risk Assessment is to educate the public of the risks inherent in acts of food
terrorism).
172. But see Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,952
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (stating that the
FDA commissioned two threat assessments, one by the Batelle Memorial Institute
and a second by the Institute of Food Technologists, to evaluate the vulnerability of
the U.S. food supply). However, the results of these assessments are classified. Id.
As such, neither has been made available to the public, nor submitted in support of
Title III’s compliance with the SPS Agreement.
173. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5 (describing the need for a risk
assessment to determine that a member’s adopted level of protection is appropriate);
see also EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 190 (explaining that Article 5.1 does not insist
that a member carry out its own risk assessment, only that a measure be based on
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Assuming arguendo that the FDA Risk Assessment is offered for the
purposes of the SPS Agreement, it is still not sufficient to support
Title III.
The assessment is too redacted to provide useful
information or inform an independent review of the threat of
174
bioterrorism,
and it addresses the broad category of food
contamination without adequate focus on the specific incident of
175
food bioterrorism. More significantly, it fails by the letter of Article
5 to fulfill the procedural and substantive requirements of a
supportive risk assessment. Finally, it is possible that no risk
assessment could adequately support Title III as currently
implemented because Title III’s ability to provide sufficient
protection against bioterrorism is weakened by the number of direct176
to-consumer food sources that are exempted from the regulation.
a.

General deficiencies of the FDA Risk Assessment

The FDA Risk Assessment is generally deficient as an evaluation of
the risk of bioterrorism because it fails to address the particular
177
threat or effect of intentional food contamination. The FDA relies
primarily upon classified information to evaluate the vulnerability of
the food supply and the risk of bioterrorism, leaving many aspects of
178
its analysis obscurely unexplained.
While the Agency identifies

some risk assessment, and that a measure “might well find its objective justification in
a risk assessment carried out by another Member, or an international organization”).
The requirements that the measure be “based on” a risk assessment, and that a
member must produce an assessment to justify a disputed measure under Article 5.8
remain regardless of who performs the assessment. See infra notes 199-201 and
accompanying text (concluding that Title III is not “based on” any published risk
assessment available; thus, the United States has violated Article 5.1).
174. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13 pt. I, ¶ 5 (“This Risk Assessment uses
scientific evidence on food terrorism to the extent that it exists and is available, but
balances this disclosure with the need to maintain the integrity of classified
information.”). This paragraph goes on to note that the assessment is based “solely
on unclassified information.” Id.
175. See, e.g., id. at pt. II.B (analyzing the likely magnitude of the risk, in terms of
severity and duration of effect, by equating accidental and deliberate contamination
and relying on reports of the spread of foodborne disease caused by unintentional
contamination).
176. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
177. See EC-Hormones, ¶¶ 182-184 (interpreting the treaty definition of a risk
assessment to require a two-step process, as laid out in paragraph four of Annex A of
the SPS Agreement). This process requires a risk assessment to first “identify the
adverse effects on human health (if any) arising from the [specific risk at issue]” and “if
any such adverse effects exists, evaluate the potential or probability of occurrence of
such effects.” Id. ¶¶ 183-184 (alteration in original).
178. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. I (disclosing at the outset that the
assessments performed by the FDA to assess the risk of food terrorism are largely
classified in nature); see also supra text accompanying note 174.
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biological agents that could be used as bioterrorist weapons, and
suggests the threat to the U.S. food supply is “more than
180
theoretical,” it also admits the difficulty of predicting with any
181
certainty the likelihood that a bioterrorist attack will actually occur.
Understandably, no one is able to predict precisely the threat of
bioterrorism. Indeed, as a precautionary measure, other nations have
reported heightened states of alert for biological attacks via air, food,
182
or water.
However, if the FDA possesses information that more
specifically identifies the bioterrorism threat to the food supply, such
materials should be made available in a more detailed and
183
transparent assessment to other WTO members.
In addition, the FDA relies heavily on reports of foodborne disease
caused by unintentional contamination to demonstrate the potential
184
reach of food outbreaks, but fails to identify the consequences of a
179. See, e.g., FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.A (listing Bacillus anthracis
(anthrax) and Clostridium botulinum (botulism) as deadly Category A agents, which
are high-priority agents because of their potential impact on human life and health).
180. Id. pt. II.C, ¶ 5; see id. at pt. II.C, ¶¶ 6-7 (documenting some unclassified
reports of terrorist organizations’ attempts to acquire biological materials, such as a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) report that documents recovered in
Afghanistan mentioned the use of nicotine and solanine, two naturally occurring
toxins, as poisons in terrorist activities); see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., TERRORIST
THREATS TO FOOD: GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING AND STRENGTHENING PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE SYSTEMS 1 (2002) (warning that “[t]he malicious contamination of food for
terrorist purposes is a real and current threat”).
181. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.C, ¶ 2 (noting that “it is
difficult for FDA to predict with any certainty the likelihood that an act of food
terrorism will occur”); see also Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg.
58,894, 58,952 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule)
(describing that because the probability of a bioterrorist attack occurring and the
exact reduction of risk as a result of the new registration provisions is unknown, the
FDA has analogized to past outbreaks resulting from domestic incidents of accidental
and intentional food contamination to illustrate the cost of foodborne public health
emergencies); Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974, 59,064
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) (admitting that
because the FDA “lacks data to estimate the likelihood of a strike occurring,” the
agency again used a comparison to the risk associated with accidentally contaminated
imported foods).
182. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 180, at 2.
183. If the U.S. government does disclose other classified information that was
used as the basis for the FDA Risk Assessment, or another assessment otherwise
supporting Title III, this Comment’s analysis that the United States violated Article
5.1, infra Part II.B.2.b, could change, as classified information may tend to show that
the measure is in fact amply supported. Without such information, however, and in
light of the fact that the U.S. has not yet provided any information of a risk
assessment despite many requests from international trading partners, this
Comment’s current analysis holds true.
184. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pts. II.B-D (assessing the effect,
exposure, and risk of a successful bioterrorist attack by analogizing to unintentional
food contamination, instead of providing information pertaining specifically to
intentional contamination); see also supra note 181 (describing how the FDA

BOISEN_OFFTOPRINTER

706

1/30/2007 12:45:09 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:3

185

successful and intentional food attack.
Although “risk assessments
need not be based entirely on research in the physical sciences[,]
186
nor . . . examine only quantitative risks,” an assessment must be
applied to the particular risk that the disputed sanitary measure is
187
designed to prevent.
The FDA Risk Assessment, which does not
provide an analysis of the effect a specifically targeted bioterrorism
attack would have on the food supply, is lacking in this respect.
b. The FDA Risk Assessment fails to satisfy the procedural and
substantive requirements of Article 5.1 and does not demonstrate
reasonable support for Title III
In addition to these general problems, the FDA Risk Assessment
also fails to satisfy the specific procedural and substantive
requirements of Article 5.1. The Appellate Body in EC-Hormone
derived a procedural and substantive requirement from two
important words in Article 5.1: “Members shall ensure that their
188
sanitary . . . measures are based on a[] [risk] assessment. . . .”
The procedural element requires that a member initially obtain a
189
risk assessment, which serves as the basis for an enacted measure.
The EC-Hormones Panel construed the term “based on” to establish a
“minimum procedural requirement” that a member actually “took
190
into account” certain studies and assessments in forming the
191
While the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones
measure in dispute.
analogizes to events of unintentional contamination to assess the risks of
bioterrorism and the costs of the new regulations, under both registration and prior
notice interim rules).
185. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.B (describing illness and death,
economic effects, and sociological and political implications such as public fear and
anxiety as the consequences of accidental food outbreaks, but failing to account for
any consequences of intentional contamination).
186. See Victor, supra note 35, at 901 (highlighting that the Appellate Body in ECHormones stressed that risk assessments need not be fully and completely supported
by scientific information).
187. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 204-209 (emphasizing that a risk
assessment must support the specific risk targeted in the domestic measure at issue,
and finding that because the EC risk assessments only generally addressed the risk of
growth hormones without specifically addressing the risk of improper administration
of hormones (the impetus of the EC ban), the EC measure was not supported).
188. See id. ¶ 179 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting SPS
Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.1).
189. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.1 (listing the basic risk assessment
principle); see also EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 188-191 (discussing the procedural
requirement of Article 5.1); supra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining Article
5 in detail).
190. EC-Hormones, Complaint by Canada, supra note 93, ¶ 8.116; EC-Hormones,
Complaint by the United States, supra note 97, ¶ 8.113.
191. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 188-189 (relaying and discarding the
Panel’s textual interpretations of Article 5).
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192

rejected the Panel’s textual construction, it embraced the Panel’s
193
The Appellate Body re-affirmed that
underlying legal reasoning.
the term “based on” requires that a member, at a minimum, obtain a
194
risk assessment that forms the basis for the disputed measure.
195
Next, the assessment must substantively support the measure.
This substantive element involves a two part inquiry: first, an
examination of the scientific conclusions reached in the assessment
and implicit in the enacted measure and, second, an evaluation of
196
the relationship between the two sets of scientific conclusions.
Ultimately, the risk assessment must demonstrate reasonable support
197
for the disputed measure.
Thus, “there is not only a procedural
requirement to obtain a risk assessment,” but also a “‘substantive
requirement that there be a rational relationship between the measure
198
and the risk assessment.’”
Title III is not procedurally “based on” the FDA Risk Assessment.
The Bioterrorism Act was enacted on June 12, 2002, well before the
199
publication of this assessment.
Furthermore, nothing in the Act
acknowledges the FDA Risk Assessment, or any other risk assessment,
200
in support of the measure.
It is also unclear how the FDA Risk
Assessment may have shaped the registration or prior notice
regulations implementing Title III, which were published
192. See id. ¶ 189 (preferring to retain the language specifically used in the
Agreement to remain consistent with the principle of plain language interpretation,
rather than adopt the “take into account” language employed by the Panel, for which
no textual basis exists in Article 5).
193. Id. (rejecting the Panel’s textual interpretations, but rearticulating the
Panel’s basic legal argument that there is an inherent procedural requirement in
Article 5).
194. Id. (announcing the term “based on” compels a “certain objective
relationship . . . that persists and is observable between an SPS measure and a risk
assessment”).
195. See id. ¶ 193 (requiring that the results of the obtained risk assessment also
“reasonably support” the measure as a substantive matter).
196. SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.1; see EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 192209 (explaining the substantive requirement of Article 5.1).
197. EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 193.
198. Victor, supra note 35, at 901 (quoting, in part, EC-Hormones, supra note 25,
¶ 193).
199. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, pmbl., 116 Stat. 594, 594 (noting the date of enactment
as June 12, 2002).
200. See id. (failing to mention any supportive risk assessment or other scientific
study to justify the legislative act); see also EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 191 (pointing
out that preambles of legislative acts or administrative regulations commonly fulfill
requirements of WTO members, such as identifying scientific support for a measure
under the SPS Agreement). The Appellate Body does acknowledge, however, that
the absence of reference to a scientific study is not dispositive proof that no scientific
support exists because such preambles are not a requirement of any WTO
Agreement, including the SPS Agreement. EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 191.
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201

simultaneously with the FDA Risk Assessment. Therefore, the FDA
Risk Assessment could not logically have formed the basis for Title III
because it was published after the Act’s passage and simultaneously
202
with the implementation of the regulations.
Title III is also not substantively “based on” the FDA Risk
Assessment because the scientific conclusions contained in the risk
assessment fail to justify the conclusions implicit in the regulation.
The FDA Risk Assessment concludes that there is a hazard that deadly
203
pathogens could be used as bioterrorist agents and that a successful
attack could impact human life and the nation’s economic vitality or
204
cause sociological and political ramifications.
The assessment
repeatedly stresses the uncertain nature of bioterrorism and
correspondingly, the Agency’s inability to fully assess the threat of

201. See supra notes 7, 17, 170 (listing October 10, 2003 as the date of notification
in the Federal Register of the availability of the FDA Risk Assessment, as well as the
publication date for the FDA interim rules on registration and prior notice,
respectively).
202. This argument assumes that the FDA Risk Assessment is the only assessment
FDA or Congress could have consulted in the formation of Title III and its
regulations. This assumption is warranted because as of yet, no other risk assessment
has been identified by either party. However, it is important to note, as the Appellate
Body did, that Article 5 does not require that the member in question have
performed the risk assessment upon which the measure is based. Instead, the
member must clearly offer any designated, “substitute” risk assessment in support of
its measure. EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 41, 190; see supra text accompanying
note 173.
203. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.A, ¶ 1-2 (describing activities of
the CDC, even before the 2001 anthrax attacks, to identify and rank several food
pathogens as critical agents for possible terrorist attacks, among which anthrax and
botulism ranked as “Category A” high-priority substances). However, the assessment
further notes that the majority of biological agents identified by the CDC were
classified as “Category B” agents because they are moderately easy to disseminate and
cause moderate to low morbidity, which is the ratio of observable deaths to total
population. Id.
204. See Joseph A. Levitt, CFSAN’s Program Priorities: From Food Safety to Food Security,
58 FOOD DRUG L.J. 19, 20 (2003) (cautioning that if a bioterrorist attack is successful,
“the result could be significant morbidity and mortality [human health effects] as
well as significant economic loss”); see also FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt.
II.B.1 (considering the possible impact of bioterrorism on human life and health by
using CDC data documenting the annual effect of accidental contamination in the
United States at 76,000,000 illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths); id.
pt. II.B.2 (describing at least three types of economic effects generated by food
terrorism: direct economic loss from the cost of response, indirect effects suffered by
industry, and international ramifications, such as trade embargoes or other trade
reactions to contaminated U.S. products); id. pt. II.B.3 (highlighting the potential
social impact of bioterrorism as parallel to the public hysteria experienced in the
United States when Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (“BSE”) or “mad cow
disease” was discovered in British cattle in the late 1980s). The assessment also
explains that societal fears and anxieties produced by such an event could reduce
confidence in the political system and governing bodies or result in political
destabilization, as was experienced by Great Britain during the mad cow crisis. Id.
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205

future attacks.
However, the FDA documents some evidence of
206
terrorist plans to acquire biological contaminants and notes the
207
“unique susceptibility” of food products generally. Implicit in Title
III and its implementing regulations are three conclusions:
(1) increased oversight of food suppliers can deter deliberate food
208
contamination; (2) advanced notice of the entry of foreign foods
into the United States will enable the FDA to investigate reported
209
threats; and (3) increased avenues of communication can reduce
210
the spread of any successful attack.
The fatal flaw of the FDA Risk Assessment is that it fails to
demonstrate reasonable support for Title III or show that the
measure is substantively “based on” the assessment’s scientific

205. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.C (acknowledging that
uncertainty must factor into the risk assessment); see also supra note 181 and
accompanying text (describing repeated instances where the FDA admits it lacks the
information and capability to fully assess the threat, likelihood, or magnitude of a
bioterrorism attack).
206. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.C (pointing out the seizure of
U.S. agricultural documents that had been translated into Arabic from an Al Qaeda
location in Afghanistan, and a report from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency that
in 2003, the British investigated a suspected Al Qaeda plot to poison their troops’
food supplies).
207. See id. at pt. II.C, ¶ 4 (relying on information from CDC experts that
describes how the relative centralization of food production in the United States, and
the distribution of food products on a global scale, creates a vulnerability in the food
supply to wide-scale sabotage).
208. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,951-52
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (listing the
FDA’s expectation that registration will deter bioterrorists by making their activities
traceable).
209. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974, 59,064
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) (presuming that
increased information about imported foods will help the FDA match bioterrorism
intelligence to imported food shipments and therefore enhance containment of
food products that are in fact adulterated at port); see also Matthew T. McGrath &
Cortney O’Toole Morgan, Business Regulation: Customs Law, 37 INT’L LAW. 245, 25354 (2003) (describing how the Prior Notice of Imported Food rule provides the FDA
with increased inspection authority).
210. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,952
(expecting that updated registration contact information and the specific
designation of a U.S. agent will accelerate the FDA’s communication with food
facilities post-incident, so that the effects of a potential bioterrorist attack could be
contained through quick, coordinated agency and facility reaction to the outbreak);
see also Levitt, supra note 204, at 24 (stressing the need for improved communication
and coordination to limit biological contamination’s effects and praising Title III’s
registration provisions that allow the FDA to quickly conduct trace-back
investigations to map out the contamination route).
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conclusions.
This mirrors the specific finding in EC-Hormones.
Although the EC submitted various risk assessments in support of its
measure, the scientific conclusions contained therein revealed that
the banned growth hormones generally did not pose a threat to
213
human life or health.
Accordingly, the Appellate Body concluded
214
Similarly, nothing in
that the EC import ban was not warranted.
FDA’s Risk Assessment establishes that requiring foreign importers to
provide prior notice before importing food into the United States, or
to designate a U.S. agent, will protect human life or health from
215
potential acts of bioterrorism.
There are two reasons why the FDA Risk Assessment substantively
fails to provide reasonable support for Title III. First, it is far too
broad in scope. All food, from both domestic and foreign sources,
and all types of contamination, both accidental and deliberate, are
216
lumped together, despite the fact that intentional contamination is
217
a distinct danger. Title III unilaterally imposes increased regulation
on foreign imports, but the assessment fails to sufficiently
211. See infra notes 217-227 and accompanying text (arguing that there is no
rational relationship between the FDA Risk Assessment and Title III and its
regulations, and explaining why the assessment fails the substantive requirement).
212. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 208 (concluding that “no risk assessment . . .
reasonably supports or warrants” the EC import prohibition).
213. See id. ¶ 206 (concluding that most if not all of the scientific studies referred
to the Panel by the EC found that the use of the banned hormones for growth
promotion in animals was safe); see also Victor, supra note 35, at 899 (declaring that
“[u]nfortunate for the EC’s position, however, was the fact that every risk assessment
of these hormones had shown that growth hormones applied according to good
veterinary practices would result in no significant harm to humans,” including at
least two reviews commissioned by the EC itself).
214. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 207 (reviewing the EC’s scientific reports
and data and concurring with the Panel decision that this evidence presented a
“theoretical framework” for the analysis of the effect of growth hormones, but did
not “investigate and evaluate” the actual problems the EC claimed to be
experiencing as a result of hormone-treated meat).
215. See supra notes 208-09.
216. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.B (analyzing all types of
contamination, including some deliberate acts, as well as data from accidental
outbreaks originating from domestic and foreign sources to assess the risk of
bioterrorism).
217. Bioterrorism, by definition, is specifically targeted to cause maximum human
casualties and thus can be significantly different from accidental food outbreaks in
terms of exposure and spread of the contamination. See Registration of Food
Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,952 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (admitting that an intentional attack on the food
supply would probably be significantly more costly, and sicken many more U.S.
citizens, than an act of accidental food contamination). But see FDA RISK ASSESSMENT,
supra note 13, pt. II.B, ¶ 1 (defending the analogy to unintentional contamination,
calling attention to the similarities between the two forms of contamination, and
describing the risk to consumers as “comparable, regardless of whether the
contamination was deliberate or accidental”).
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demonstrate that imported foods carry a higher risk of use in
biological attacks or are more susceptible to deliberate
218
contamination. In fact, the exact opposite appears to be true. Past
incidents of food bioterrorism in the United States, targeted at
Americans themselves or specific American food sources, have all
been perpetrated by individuals living in the country and using
219
domestic food sources.
A risk assessment must evaluate the specific risk mitigated by the
establishment of the sanitary measure; it should not simply
220
demonstrate a cognizable threat.
The EC hormone ban was
rejected because its risk assessments considered only the general
effects of hormone use, without appropriate focus on the six banned
hormones or the hormones’ potential to negatively affect meat
221
products in particular. In similar fashion, the FDA Risk Assessment
pertains to the entire category of food contamination, without
appropriate concentration on the actual threat of purposeful,
222
biological contamination of imported food products.
218. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.A (characterizing the risk of
certain biological agents, but failing to identify any distinction between the threat of
bioterrorism attempted on domestic versus foreign food products).
219. See Hodge, supra note 2, at 255 (reciting past incidents of bioterrorism, which
were all domestic incidents). Hodge describes bioterrorism events dating back to the
American colonial period, when British and French troops exchanged dry goods
intentionally contaminated with smallpox with Native Americans. He also lists two
major bioterrorism attempts on U.S. soil in the late twentieth century: a foiled plot
to poison water supplies in Midwestern cities with typhoid bacteria, resulting in the
arrests of several Chicago citizens; and the 1982 contamination of local salad bars
with salmonella to disrupt a local Oregon election. Id. In closing, Hodge notes that
the FBI, the federal agency responsible for, inter alia, investigations of domestic
threats of terrorism, has investigated hundreds of claims of bioterrorism threats in
the years after the 2001 anthrax attacks. Id. Note, however, that each of these
attacks occurred by domestic persons who used domestic food products already in the
United States. Id.; see FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pts. I-II.A (listing past acts
of domestic deliberate food contamination, including those reported in the Hodge
article, but failing to identify any past acts of deliberate food contamination
originating from foreign sources); cf. Alexander, supra note 13, at 81-82 (describing
the endeavors of the Aum Shinrikyo Japanese cult to release numerous biological
and chemical agents on the people of Japan over the last thirty years, including a
highly publicized successful attack on the Tokyo subway system using the nerve gas
sarin, thus revealing that other countries grappling with bioterrorism concerns also
face a demonstrated risk from domestic persons using domestic means of attack).
220. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 203 (stating that the risks articulated by the
EC did not address the specific substances at issue because they merely pronounced
general problems with control over the hormones, and finding that the EC’s
articulated risks were insufficient to show that the hormones in dispute actually
posed a real threat to human life and health).
221. Id. ¶ 199 (noting that the EC risk assessments applied to entire categories of
hormones, rather than narrow application to the specific risk of growth hormones
and that the assessments further failed to evaluate the carcinogenic effects of
hormones in food, specifically meat products).
222. FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. I.
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Second, the scientific conclusions implicit in Title III and the
FDA’s regulations focus on the need for increased communication,
whereas the conclusions derived from the FDA Risk Assessment
support increased controls on biological agents, but not post-attack
223
response mechanisms.
The FDA document contains no specific
assessment of the magnitude, effect, or potential reach of a
224
bioterrorist attack, yet Title III purports to minimize the risk of
225
Because the
bioterrorism by reducing the spread of an outbreak.
risk assessment fails to explore the effect or potential spread of a
226
deliberate food attack, it likewise fails to justify responsive measures.
This is comparable to the EC-Hormones finding that the EC’s
responsive measure to prevent the consumption of harmful growth
hormones was not scientifically justified because its risk assessments
failed to consider the particular risk in the administration of the
banned growth hormones in cattle and instead, merely asserted
227
generalized claims of the hormones’ carcinogenic properties.
In
conclusion, because Title III is neither procedurally nor substantively
“based on” the FDA Risk Assessment, it violates Article 5.1 of the SPS
228
Agreement.
223. Compare id. pt. II.A (characterizing the likelihood of bioterrorist targeting of
certain biological agents as weapons), with Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, tit. 2, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., 21 U.S.C.A.,
and 42 U.S.C.A. (West 2006) (increasing federal controls over biological agents).
Title II of the Bioterrorism Act is clearly warranted by the scientific findings in the
FDA Risk Assessment, which demonstrate that certain biological agents are in fact
very harmful to human life and health, namely, anthrax and botulism, which are
identified in the FDA Risk Assessment as “Category A” agents, and supplies of such
toxins should be properly protected). FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.A.
224. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.B (characterizing the
magnitude of the risk based on unintentional contamination only).
225. See supra text accompanying note 46 (listing the communication benefits of
registration and how they are designed to limit the effective spread of
biocontaminants).
226. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.B (limiting the assessment
explicitly to unintentional food contamination).
227. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 200 (holding that the studies, articles, and
opinions submitted by the EC failed to address the particular risk at stake, as
required by paragraph four in the Annex of the SPS Agreement, which describes the
purpose of a risk assessment and what it should achieve); see also supra note 85
(detailing the SPS Agreement requirements in Annex A).
228. Cf. EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 209 (concluding that the EC violated Article
5.1 and finding that because the import ban was more stringent than the relevant
international standard, and as a result of the interrelation between the
harmonization and risk assessment principles, the EC measure was also inconsistent
with Article 3.3 (harmonization) by failing to comply with Article 5.1.). Compare
this to the above finding that Title III violates Article 5.1 and the inference that, by
implication, Title III thus violates Article 3.3. Consider also the author’s assessment
that Title III independently violates the harmonization principle. Supra note 133
and accompanying text.

BOISEN_OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

1/30/2007 12:45:09 PM

TITLE III OF THE BIOTERRORISM ACT

713

c. Title III exempts a number of significant food sources and fails to
achieve its stated level of bioterrorism protection
Although most domestic and foreign facilities are required to
register with the FDA, Title III exempts a large number of domestic
direct food-to-consumer sources from registration that would have
equal, if not greater, adverse impacts on the food supply if
229
deliberately contaminated.
While practical for other regulatory
purposes, these exemptions critically undermine the Act’s overall
ability to achieve bioterrorism protection, especially with regard to its
230
goal of deterrence.
Most importantly, these exemptions make the
possibility of conformity to Article 5 even more unfeasible because no
risk assessment can support imposition of the measure if the sanitary
231
measure will not achieve its stated level of protection.
232
from
Title III excludes over two million American farms
233
registering with the FDA, any of which would each make an easy
234
While subsequent food processing would
target for bioterrorists.
229. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d(b)(1) (West 2006) (describing that the term “facility”
does not include: “farms; restaurants; other retail food establishments; nonprofit
food establishments in which food is prepared for or served directly to the consumer;
or fishing vessels”); FDA Registration of Food Facilities, 21 C.F.R. § 1.226 (2006)
(explaining which facilities are not required to register with the FDA); see also supra
note 43 and accompanying text (describing the above, and other, exemptions from
registration requirements).
230. See Lovett, supra note 3, at 477-81 (claiming that the Bioterrorism Act
“curiously exempts” multiple facilities in which foods are prepared for or served
directly to the consumer with little explanation or justification). Lovett hypothesizes
that terrorist groups could easily tamper with food in these exempted establishments
all over the country and create havoc in the food supply. Id.
231. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5. A risk assessment must explain the
reasons for a sanitary measure designed to achieve a given level of protection. See id.
art. 5.8. If, however, flaws in the application or coverage of the sanitary measure
mean that it will not achieve that level, a risk assessment purportedly supporting the
measure will also fail. This is because a risk assessment cannot support what the
measure cannot do; that is, if the exemptions to Title III so critically weaken the
assessment’s ability to provide protection from the risk of intentional food
contamination, no risk assessment submitted in support of Title III can demonstrate
that it will, in fact, protect against bioterrorism. Id.
232. See United States Department of Agriculture Homepage, Data and Statistics,
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Census/Create_Census_US.jsp (in “Step 2,” select “Farms
(number);” in “Step 3,” select “All States, United States;” click “Add;” click “Get
Data”) (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) (documenting the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s account of the total farms in the United States, per 2002 census data, at
approximately 2,100,900).
233. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d(b)(1) (exempting farms from registration).
234. See Radford B. Davis, Agroterrorism: Need for Awareness, in PERSPECTIVES IN
WORLD FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 353-416 (Colin G. Scanes & John A. Miranowski eds.,
2004),
available
at
http://www.actionbioscience.org/newfrontiers/davis.html
(describing agriculture as the “perfect target” for bioterrorists, also called
agroterrorism). Radford explains that the agriculture industry is unmatched in
revenue and scope, as more than twenty-four million Americans are employed
directly in the agriculture industry and food accounts for over thirteen percent of the
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likely limit the effects of deliberate contamination of farm animals or
crops, accidental foodborne diseases from farm products have
severely impacted human health and the vitality of the U.S. food
235
market in the past. Despite the fact that forty percent of Americans
eat two to three meals weekly at restaurants and fast food
236
establishments, Title III also exempts restaurants and other retail
237
establishments. Since these types of establishments are generally a
238
responsibility of the states, Congress may have lacked jurisdiction to
regulate them, or determined that their registration was unnecessary
239
to the effectiveness of the Act. There is, however, no assurance that
the food supply is fully safe from bioterrorism while the Bioterrorism
Act exempts from its protective measures facilities that deliver food
directly to American consumers.
In light of these significant exemptions, which weaken the
Bioterrorism Act’s protective purpose, Title III may never be
supported as a valid sanitary measure under the SPS Agreement.
Article 5 requires a risk assessment to show that a sanitary measure is
necessary to achieve the level of protection deemed appropriate by a
certain member, in this case protection against intentionally
240
contaminated foods. Here, gaping holes in the application of Title
U.S. Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”), one measurement of the size of an economy.
As the United States is a world leader in food production, if any one of its major food
products, including corn, soy, cattle, or poultry, were significantly affected by a
bioterrorist act, the result could be “catastrophic.” Consequently, agroterrorism
should not only concern the farmer, but also businesses such as suppliers,
transporters, grocery stores, or restaurants, as well as the end consumer, who could
all expect to suffer from bioterrorism’s effects. Id.
235. See, e.g., FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13,, pt. II.B.1, ¶ 3 (detailing how
one of the largest reported food outbreaks involved unintentional biological
contamination of milk with Salmonella typhimurium, during the pasteurization process
at a farm facility that resulted in the hospitalization of nearly 170,000 Americans).
236. See How and Where America Eats, CBS Poll, Nov. 20, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2005/11/20/opinion/polls/main1060315.shtml (providing poll data
that reveals twenty-one percent of Americans ate at a restaurant for at least two or
three meals in a week, and that seventeen percent of the same group polled for the
same time frame had eaten at fast food establishments).
237. 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d(b)(1).
238. See Lovett, supra note 3, at 478 n.121 (citing Kellogg Co. v. Mattox, 763 F.
Supp. 1369 (N.D. Tex. 1991), for the proposition that the oversight and
administration of these facilities falls under the jurisdiction of the individual states,
not the federal government, to provide one reason for the exemption in section 305
registration).
239. See id. at 478 n.120 (noting from her research of the legislative history of the
Bioterrorism Act that there is little clarification as to why the exemptions are in
place, but at least some indication that Congress members may have considered
registration of these facilities “unnecessary” for the Bioterrorism Act as a whole to be
effective). Lovett cites to a public document recording part of the Senate
amendments to the Act in its initial stages in support. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1073448 (2001).
240. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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III allow various avenues for bioterrorists to strike the food supply.
Therefore, no risk assessment may ever adequately support the need
for Title III as a sanitary measure because of the inherent flaws that
render it ineffective.
III. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: IMPLICATIONS OF THE WTO VIOLATION
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FUTURE BIOTERRORISM PLAN THAT IS
BOTH EFFECTIVE AND INTERNATIONALLY SENSITIVE
As demonstrated above, persuasive arguments can be made that
Title III of the Bioterrorism Act violates the WTO SPS Agreement.
First, Title III discriminates against foreign food imports in violation
of Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the Agreement and erects administrative
241
barriers to trade.
Moreover, the measure is unsupported by an
242
These violations
assessment of risk as required under Article 5.1.
are significant: the majority of disputes under the SPS Agreement
have focused on either a failure to conduct or sufficiently base a
measure on a risk assessment, or a breach of the Agreement’s non243
discrimination principles.
The Bioterrorism Act as written specifically requires both of the
244
trade-restrictive measures in question.
Consequently, the FDA
cannot be less trade-restrictive in implementing the title because it is
245
constrained by the language Congress selected. If Title III cannot
be changed or implemented in a less trade-restrictive manner
through agency regulation, it should be abandoned in order to
remain consistent with WTO trade obligations.

241. See supra Part II.B.1 (analyzing Title III under the three-part discrimination
framework and concluding that because the measure arbitrarily imposes different
levels of sanitary protection on domestic versus foreign-produced food products and
the restriction negatively impacts foreign trade, it violates Article 5.5, and by
implication Article 2.3, of the SPS Agreement).
242. See supra Part II.B.2 (evaluating the FDA Risk Assessment under a
presumption that it would be offered in support of Title III, and determining that
Title III is neither procedurally nor substantively based on the FDA assessment and
therefore violates the risk assessment requirement of Article 5.1 of the SPS
Agreement).
243. Davey, supra note 90, at 90.
244. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 350d, 381 (West 2006) (applying the registration and
prior notice requirements by the letter of the legislation to all foreign
manufacturers).
245. See, e.g., Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,915
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (responding
twice to suggestions to modify the U.S. agent requirements and recognizing that the
FDA has acted consistently to structure the agent requirements by the plain language
of the Bioterrorism Act, as Congress intended).
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Should the legislation be retained, there is a significant risk that a
dispute lodged against the United States in the WTO system would be
246
The “‘one very powerful, central element of the
successful.
247
WTO . . . is its ability to deliver equity’ through dispute settlement.”
Overall, WTO members express overwhelming support for the
248
dispute settlement system, despite a somewhat varied history with
249
respect to enforcement of decisions.
Generally, the United States
250
has complied with WTO decisions and in this case, should an
246. See supra Parts II.B.1-II.B.2 (making the case that Title III violates two articles
of the SPS Agreement, either of which would support an adverse finding against the
United States).
247. Daniel Pruzin & Christopher S. Rugaber, Officials Predict Rise in Dispute Cases
at WTO After Collapse of Doha Trade Talks, 23 INT’L TRADE REP. 1124, 1124 (2006)
(quoting Australia’s Trade Minister, Mark Vaile); see Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of
WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of Shields Over Swords, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
305, 311-12 (2004) (asserting that the dispute settlement mechanism is the most
important instrument in the WTO’s arsenal and has helped it to achieve a level of
institutional power that sets it apart from other international organizations).
Kalderimis calls the system an “important success” and praises its mandatory,
legalistic, and binding resolution of international trade disputes. Id.
248. See Van der Borght, supra note 90, at 1225 (“If there is one point of
agreement among the WTO [m]embers . . . it is their general satisfaction with the
[dispute settlement] system.”); see also EPPING, supra note 92, at 49 (noting that even
if a country does not agree with a decision of the WTO, it is always in the country’s
best interest to remain within the WTO framework). Van der Borght conveys
numerous praises of the system. She notes that the dispute settlement mechanism
has strengthened the multilateral system as a whole, acting as a neutral and impartial
body in which positive and satisfactory solutions are rendered. Van der Borght, supra
note 90, at 1225. Its most frequent praise is that it provides a predictable, rules-based
forum for resolution of disputes. Id. Additionally, complainants in the system are
generally satisfied by successful rulings. See Davey, supra note 90, at 80-81 (reviewing
all 38 Panel and 28 Appellate Body reports from 1994 until 2000 to analyze member
countries’ satisfaction with the system and its impact on members’ national powers);
Pruzin & Rugaber, supra note 247, at 1124 (relaying comments that the dispute
settlement process has increasingly worked well to resolve disagreements between
WTO members).
249. For example, the EC hormone dispute is still raging. See Daniel Pruzin &
Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Approves U.S., Canada Sanctions on EU of $124.5 Million in Beef
Hormone Dispute, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. 1158, 1158 (1999) (conveying the WTO
approval of trade sanctions imposed upon the EC by the United States and Canada
because of the EC’s refusal to remove the import ban on hormone-treated beef). In
the most recent development, the EC has attempted to support its continued ban on
hormone-treated meat imports with a new risk assessment. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S.,
Canada Fault EU Risk Assessment in WTO Dispute Over Hormone-Treated Beef, 23 INT’L
TRADE REP. 1455, 1455 (2006) (reporting arguments that the European Union has
once again failed to produce scientific evidence in the form of a risk assessment
sufficient to support its ban).
250. E.g., Esther Lam, U.S. to Implement WTO Decision that Rejected Use of Zeroing
Method, 23 INT’L TRADE REP. 1203 (2006); see Esther Lam, EU Will Not Appeal WTO
DRAMs Ruling; U.S. Will Implement Korea CVD Decision, 22 INT’L TRADE REP. 1305
(2005) (stating that both the European Union and the United States will comply with
WTO rulings in favor of Korea’s free export of dynamic random access memory
semiconductors (DRAMs)); see also Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review
2004, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 110-11 (2004) (reporting that in 2004 the
United States made “significant progress towards compliance in several outstanding
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adverse ruling on Title III be rendered, there are strong motivations
to compel continued U.S. compliance with the Agreement.
Foremost, the United States is currently engaged in ongoing
disputes over important U.S. products and needs support from the
251
WTO system to pursue favorable trade remedies in these cases. The
United States has a strong interest in ensuring that other WTO
members comply with adverse rulings and respect the authority of the
system as a whole and should, therefore, set the example by its own
compliance. Furthermore, the WTO allows members to impose
sanctions against countries who fail to reduce barriers to trade after
252
an unsuccessful dispute. Given the broad scope of Title III, which is
applicable to all foreign nations that import food products into the
United States, retaliatory sanctions in aggregate could be crippling.
In addition, the option of diplomacy always remains. The United
States can mend bridges, broken by the restrictive Title III, by
approaching food security in the future on an international level.
International cooperation that takes both bioterrorism and trade
concerns into account may ease tensions between the United States
and trading partners and prevent a dispute from being lodged in the
dispute settlement system. This is not only a cooperative and
diplomatic solution, but also an effective one. The most efficient way
to truly achieve global bioterrorism awareness, prevention, and
preparedness, for both the United States and the world, is through

cases”). But see Yerkey, supra note 15, at 19 (quoting EC allegations that “the U.S.
record of ‘prompt compliance’ with dispute settlement rulings issued by the World
Trade Organization has been poor”). Yerkey notes, however, that of the seventeen
adverse WTO rulings, the United States has only failed to comply, or been forced to
comply after subsequent proceedings, with six of those decisions. Id.
251. See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 250, at 178-98 (discussing the most recent
decision, favoring the United States, by the Appellate Body in the United StatesCanada softwood lumber dispute, the longest-running trade dispute between the two
nations that has persisted for twenty-three years). Another example is clearly
depicted in the EC hormone dispute. While the United States has secured approval
for sanctions against the EC, continued support from the WTO system is needed to
maintain such measures. See Pruzin, supra note 249, at 1455-56 (describing how the
EC has recently initiated proceedings against the United States and Canada,
attempting to force these countries to lift the punitive sanctions in place against the
EC); see also Bhala & Gantz, supra note 250, at 114-16 (noting that the principal issue
with the EC’s compliance in the WTO system is still the hormone problem, and that
the United States remains unconvinced that it should terminate its efforts against the
EC ban).
252. See EPPING, supra note 92, at 49 (explaining that the system of punishment
under the WTO is in the form of punitive tariffs, intended to compensate damaged
countries for losses caused by trade-restricting member); Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note
249, at 1158 (describing the details of the WTO-approved sanctions against the
European Union for its continued maintenance of a beef import ban).
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intergovernmental organizations.
In Europe, progress is already
underway to pool available resources and knowledge and unite the
254
The United States
many nations with bioterrorism concerns.
should cooperate with the governments of other nations and
intergovernmental agencies to form any future plans for future
bioterrorism prevention and achieve an efficient and internationallysensitive strategy.

253. See Fidler, supra note 2, at 13-14 (predicting that the anthrax attacks may
bring “back from the dead” the former international attempts to negotiate a
Biological Weapons Convention to create protocol for responding to bioterrorist
incidents globally and synchronize efforts to prepare for catastrophic terrorism using
biological weapons); Interpol Media Release, Bio-Terrorism Conference Opens with
Warning of Major Threat: Interpol Member Countries Seek Co-ordinated Global Response,
Mar. 1, 2005, http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/PressReleases/PR2005/PR
200510.asp (quoting the Interpol Secretary General Ronald K. Noble, who describes
bioterrorism as “‘[a] global threat that requires a global response’”). Interpol is the
world’s largest international police organization and boasts membership from over
184 countries worldwide. The organization aims to facilitate international police
cooperation even where diplomatic relations between nations are not particularly
strong, in the interest of preventing international acts of crime. See Interpol Website,
About Interpol, http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/default.asp (last visited Nov.
10, 2006). But see Alexander, supra note 13, at 88-89 (maintaining that it is “generally
easier to take steps at home than it is to promote international action”). Alexander
questions the immediate efficiency of international efforts, but does not discount the
advantages of international bioterrorism cooperation. Id. Indeed, he ultimately
notes that many governments have pursued international measures to deal with acts
of terrorism and bioterrorism alike. Id. at 88.
254. See Interpol Media Release, supra note 253 (describing recent efforts in 2005
to organize a global solution to the global problem of bioterrorism). The Global
Bioterrorism Conference, held by Interpol, saw over 150 countries in attendance to
learn more about the growing problem of bioterrorism and to discuss how to attack
bioterrorism on domestic levels, but also as part of an international team. Preventing
and fighting bioterrorism worldwide is one of Interpol’s highest priority concerns,
and the Bioterrorism Conference was a part of its most public ventures to increase
international cooperation and work towards a global prevention plan. At a press
conference following the Bioterrorism Conference, Interpol President Jackie Selebi
declared, “‘[w]e must build bridges . . . [to] prevent bio-terrorism through sustained
communication with international law enforcement to mitigate the risks we are
facing. Interpol and police services around the world must be part of a broader
integrated response to combat the threat of biological weapons.’” Interpol Media
Release, Interpol Conference Agrees on Measures to Fight Bio-Terrorism: Emphasis on
Training Police, Better International Cooperation, Mar. 2, 2005, http://www.interpol/
int/Public/ICPO/PressReleases/PR2005/PR200511.asp.

